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“We move oil all over the world. We have barrels in storage. 
They are real, not just things on paper. They go on ships and 
they go to refineries.”1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In June 2011, Coca-Cola ran out of patience . . . and alumi-
num. So the company filed a complaint with the London Metal 
Exchange (LME), the world’s largest organized market for in-
dustrial metals, claiming that, for months, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (Goldman) had hoarded 
enough commercial aluminum in its metal warehouses in De-
 
 1. David Sheppard & Alexandra Alper, As Banks Deepen Commodity 
Deals, Volcker Test Likely, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available at http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-commodities-forwards-banks-idUSBRE8620 
6420120703 (quoting an anonymous Wall Street bank executive). 
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troit to drive global aluminum prices to record levels.2 For Co-
ca-Cola, which uses aluminum cans to package its iconic soft 
drinks, this artificial delivery bottleneck at Goldman’s metal 
warehouses meant an unjustified rise in operational costs and 
potential disruptions of its production process.3
On September 20, 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) issued an order threatening to penalize 
JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMC), for potentially misleading 
the agency in its probe of the company’s allegedly manipulative 
trade practices.
 
4 The FERC began its formal investigation in 
August 2011, after receiving complaints from electric power 
grid operators in California and the Midwest alleging that 
JPMC’s power traders had intentionally inflated wholesale 
prices at which the company supplied these important regional 
markets with electricity.5
In July 2012, the Financial Times reported that JPMC, 
Goldman, and Morgan Stanley had struck similarly-structured 
deals, under which they would supply crude oil to several major 
U.S. oil refineries and buy those refineries’ output for resale in 
the open market.
  
6 Under the terms of these deals, financially-
strapped refineries would not have to worry about any of the 
logistical details of buying, storing, and transporting oil sup-
plies or shipping their jet fuel and gasoline to customers—the 
experts at JPMC, Goldman and Morgan Stanley would take 
care of all of these operational details.7
On the surface, there is nothing particularly surprising 
about these seemingly unrelated snippets of recent news sto-
ries. Yet, when read together, they reveal something quite ex-
  
 
 2. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck: Coke’s Complaint: 12% of Global 
Stockpile Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (June 26, 2011), 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum 
-bottleneck-cokes-complaint-12-of-global-stockpile-held-here. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Kasia Klimasinska, JPMorgan Power-Trading Business Faces Sus-
pension, FERC Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-20/jpmorgan-power-trading-business-faces 
-suspension-ferc-says.html. 
 5. Gregory Meyer, JPMorgan in US Power Market Probe, FIN. TIMES, 
July 3, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0b9acbe4-c4fc-11e1-b6fd-00144fea 
bdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2eJtL04gA. 
 6. Gregory Meyer, Wall Street Banks Step up Oil Trade Role, FIN. TIMES, 
July 15, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/96c4dd5e-ce70-11e1-9fa7-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2d1EU7Cie. 
 7. Id. 
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traordinary and puzzling about current trends in the U.S. 
banking sector—and  the current state of U.S. bank regulation.  
The root of the puzzlement is the fact that all three of these 
institutions—Goldman, JPMC, and Morgan Stanley—are regis-
tered U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) that own or control 
at least one U.S. commercial bank and, by virtue of that fact, 
are subject to extensive regulation and supervision by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board).8 
One of the core principles underlying and shaping the elaborate 
regulatory regime applicable to all U.S. banks and BHCs is the 
principle of separation of banking and commerce.9 Pursuant to 
that principle, U.S. commercial banks generally are not permit-
ted to conduct any activities that do not fall within the relative-
ly narrow band of the statutory concept of “the business of 
banking.”10 Moreover, under the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 (BHCA),11 BHCs—companies that own or control U.S. 
banks—are generally restricted in their ability to engage in any 
business activities other than banking or managing banks, alt-
hough they may conduct a wider variety of financial activities 
through their non-depository subsidiaries.12 Certain BHCs 
qualifying for the status of “financial holding company” (FHC) 
may conduct broader activities that are “financial in nature,” 
including securities dealing and insurance underwriting.13
This foundational structural feature of U.S. bank regula-
tion sets it apart from the regimes found in much of the rest of 
the world’s economies, where so-called “universal banking” re-
mains the prevailing model.
 
14
 
 8. Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies, 
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008, 11:50 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-holding-companies. 
 Yet, in the last decade, large U.S. 
FHCs—including Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and JPMC—
emerged as major merchants of physical commodities and en-
ergy, notwithstanding the legal wall designed to keep them out 
 9. See Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States, 18 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 255, 267 (1994); Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking 
and Commerce in the United States: An Examination of the Principal Issues, 8 
FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 1 (1999) [hereinafter Separa-
tion]. 
 10. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012). 
 11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4, 70 Stat. 
133, 135–37 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1848 (2012)). 
 12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1843 (2012).  
 13. Id. § 1843(k)(1)(A). 
 14. Separation, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
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of any non-financial business.15
This Article advances two principal sets of claims. First, as 
a matter of doctrinal integrity, it argues that the quiet trans-
formation of U.S. FHCs into global merchants of physical com-
modities effectively nullifies the foundational principle of sepa-
ration of banking from commerce. The Article puts together the 
first comprehensive account to date of what is publicly known 
about the nature and scope of U.S. banking organizations’ 
physical commodities activities and examines the existing legal 
and regulatory framework for conducting such activities. It ar-
gues that the BHCA does not provide a sufficiently robust 
structure for the regulation and supervision of FHCs’ extensive 
commercial operations in global commodity and energy mar-
kets. Statutory authorizations of FHCs’ merchant banking op-
erations, activities “complementary” to a financial activity, and 
grandfathered commodities businesses fail to establish mean-
ingful limitations on the expansion of their physical commodi-
ties operations in practice.
 The implications are more than 
merely doctrinal. While policy-makers are struggling with the 
perplexing question of how to reduce the risks posed by the fi-
nancial activities of “too-big-to-fail” banking institutions, the 
latter are growing even bigger—and potentially riskier and less 
manageable—by expanding their operations far beyond finance.  
16
Second, as a normative matter, the Article argues that 
FHCs’ physical commodities activities raise potentially serious 
public policy concerns that may be divided into two closely re-
lated categories. To begin with, these activities threaten to un-
dermine the fundamental policy objectives that underlie the 
principle of separating banking from commerce: ensuring the 
safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, maintaining 
a fair and efficient flow of credit in the economy, protecting 
market integrity, and preventing excessive concentration of 
economic power. As the Article shows, all of these traditional 
concerns assume a new, heightened significance in the context 
of banks’ involvement in the trading of physical commodities 
and energy.
  
17
 
 15. See supra notes 2–5. 
 The need to prevent potentially excessive accu-
mulations of both risk exposure and market power in the hands 
of a few large FHCs is paramount in this respect. When the 
same banking organizations that control access to money and 
credit also control access to such universal production inputs as 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
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raw materials and energy, they are in a position to exercise 
disproportionate control over the entire economic—and, by ex-
tension, political—system. In this context, it is important to 
remind ourselves of Justice Brandeis’s famous warnings 
against the threat to American democracy posed by financial 
institutions accumulating direct control over the country’s in-
dustrial enterprises.18
Beyond the traditional normative justifications for separat-
ing banking from commerce, the Article argues that FHCs’ ex-
pansion into physical commodities implicates a distinct set of 
policy concerns relating to potential new sources and transmis-
sion channels of systemic risk, the integrity and efficacy of the 
regulatory process, and the governability of financial markets 
and institutions. Understanding FHCs’ roles as energy and 
commodity merchants challenges our current notions of how 
systemic risk originates and spreads throughout the economy 
and puts into a broader substantive context the search for more 
effective mechanisms of systemic risk containment.
 Brandeis’s words ring as alarmingly true 
today as they did nearly a hundred years ago. If there are good 
reasons to believe that extreme power breeds extreme abuses, 
the ongoing expansion of large FHCs into physical commodities 
and energy business warrants serious concern. 
19 When fi-
nancial institutions act as traders and dealers in physical 
commodities, they assume a variety of new financial and non-
financial risks—including operational, environmental, and geo-
political risks—that fundamentally alter their business and 
risk profiles. In addition to risks inherent in their traditional 
business of providing financial services, these institutions be-
come directly dependent on the operation of the multitude of 
factors shaping the costs of doing business in each individual 
commodity market.20
 
 18. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS 
USE IT 3–5 (1933). 
 Given the high degree of interconnected-
 19. Systemic risk can be defined as:  
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of 
a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital 
or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial finan-
cial-market price volatility. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).  
 20. See Commodities-Oil, Gold Slide but Post Big Monthly Gains, 
REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/ 
30/markets-commodities-idUSL2N0GV1O520130830 (discussing different 
commodities’ price shifts). Markets for different commodities—oil, natural gas, 
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ness among financial institutions, this new source of vulnera-
bility creates new, more complex patterns of systemic fragility 
and risk contagion.21
By identifying and analyzing these issues, the Article aims 
to contribute to both the long-standing academic debate on the 
efficacy and desirability of separating banking from commerce, 
on the one hand, and to the growing scholarly literature on the 
nature and regulation of systemic risk in financial markets, on 
the other. The policy implications of the analysis, moreover, 
reach beyond the realm of U.S. banking law and its founda-
tional principles. Many of the same public policy concerns that 
arise with respect to banking organizations’ commodity trad-
ing—heightened potential for conflicts of interest and market 
manipulation, an excessive concentration of market power, in-
creased systemic risk from direct linkages between financial 
markets and economically vital commodities markets, and less-
ened governability of financial institutions—are also implicated 
when non-bank systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) engage in such activities. This in turn raises broader 
theoretical questions concerning the very nature and social 
function of modern financial intermediation. Is it in the public 
interest to allow financial intermediaries in general—and SIFIs 
in particular—to engage in commercial business activities re-
lated to physical commodities and energy trading, a critically 
important sphere of economic activity? Or does the mixing of 
finance—as opposed to just banking—with this particular form 
of commerce create unique risks from the perspective of sys-
temic stability and the integrity and efficiency of today’s inter-
connected markets? While a full consideration of these issues is 
beyond the scope of the present Article, a factually-grounded 
 It also makes these emerging financial-
industrial conglomerates nearly impossible to manage, regu-
late, and supervise in accordance with the micro- and macro-
prudential policy objectives of post-crisis financial services reg-
ulation.  
 
coal, electricity, and various precious and base metals—display different char-
acteristics in terms of market structure and dynamics, the relative salience of 
various economic and political factors in determining prices and costs of doing 
business, and the applicable regulatory scheme. See id. (discussing different 
commodities’ price shifts). The nature of the commodity—its physical charac-
teristics, economic uses, and geographic concentration—accounts for many of 
these differences. Id. This diversity of commodity markets further complicates 
the task of effective systemic oversight of FHCs’ role in them. 
 21. Id. 
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examination of U.S. banking organizations’ role in commodity 
markets lays a conceptual foundation for future deliberation. 
There is a particular urgency to focusing upon that role 
now, as Goldman and Morgan Stanley, which converted to BHC 
status at the height of the financial crisis in September 2008,22 
are at the end of the five-year grace period during which they 
had to either divest their impermissible commercial businesses 
or find legal authority under the BHCA for keeping them.23 In 
the fall of 2013, the Board has to determine whether these 
firms may continue their existing commodities operations and, 
if so, under what conditions.24 Both firms have been reportedly 
lobbying the Board to allow them to keep their existing physi-
cal commodities assets and operations.25
Reaching beyond the impending Board ruling, however, the 
Article calls for a thorough reconsideration of the entire legal 
and regulatory framework for large financial institutions’ activ-
ities in physical commodity markets. Whether Goldman and 
Morgan Stanley expand or contract their existing commodity 
investments is only one aspect of the broader and far more crit-
ical inquiry into the proper legal boundaries for financial in-
termediaries’ direct involvement in commodities trade and pro-
duction. Even if individual firms were to scale down their 
physical commodities operations in the near future, either in 
response to post-crisis market trends or as a result of regulato-
ry action, it would not obviate the need to reassess the funda-
mental norms and principles underlying the current system of 
financial services regulation. 
 Given its potential 
significance, this issue should not be left to behind-the-scene 
negotiations between the banks and their regulators. By draw-
ing attention to this problem, this Article aims to reclaim the 
public’s right to participate in important public policy decisions.  
Despite both its immediate urgency and its broader doctri-
nal, policy, and conceptual significance, this topic has been 
largely ignored to date.26
 
 22. Schroeder, supra note 
 In part, this lack of scholarly attention 
8. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part III.  
 25. See David Sheppard et al., Wall Street, Fed Face Off Over Commodi-
ties, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
03/02/us-fed-banks-commodities-idUSTRE8211CC20120302. 
 26. In recent years, the academic and policy discussions of the doctrine of 
separation of banking from commerce focused mainly on issues posed by the 
attempts of commercial companies—most notably, Wal-Mart Stores Inc.—to 
develop banking capabilities. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Sepa-
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and analysis may be explained by what appears to be the delib-
erately obscure nature of banking organizations’ commodity op-
erations and lack—or extreme inadequacy—of publicly availa-
ble information on the structure and scope of such operations. 
It is virtually impossible to glean even a broad overall picture 
of Goldman’s, Morgan Stanley’s, or JPMC’s physical commodi-
ties activities from their public filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal bank regulators. Alt-
hough this Article cannot fill that informational gap, it takes 
the first step toward that goal by analyzing and synthesizing 
publicly available information on the subject and identifying 
the key areas in which further inquiry and deliberation are 
called for.  
The Article is structured as follows. Part I describes the 
normative basis for the separation of banking and commerce in 
the U.S. and outlines the key legal and regulatory conditions 
under which FHCs may conduct commercial activities. Part II 
analyzes the process and consequences of regulatory expansion, 
between 2000 and 2008, of FHCs’ authority to engage in physi-
cal commodity trading as an activity “complementary” to finan-
cial activities. Part III examines key changes in the nature and 
scope of physical commodities activities on the part of U.S. 
banking organizations in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 
Part IV discusses legal, normative, and theoretical implications 
of these phenomena for the ongoing process of financial regula-
tion reform. 
I.  WHAT WE SAY: THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND 
COMMERCE   
The separation of banking and commerce is one of the fun-
damental principles underlying the U.S. system of bank regula-
tion.27 State and federal banking statutes impose a complex 
web of restrictions and prohibitions on the business activities 
and investments of U.S. commercial banks and their affili-
ates.28
 
ration of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 385 (2012) (ar-
guing that if companies like Wal-Mart owned banks, the financial structure 
would be more diverse and less risk-prone); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart 
and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1539 
(2007) (discussing Wal-Mart’s attempt to acquire FDIC-insured industrial loan 
companies). 
 This Part describes the doctrine and its policy rationales 
 27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a 
Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the 
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and analyzes the three principal sources of FHCs’ legal author-
ity to conduct purely commercial activities. 
A. POLICY REASONS FOR SEPARATING BANKING FROM GENERAL 
COMMERCE 
Historically, banks in the United States have been granted 
charters with only limited powers. The National Bank Act of 
1863 grants federally-chartered, or national, banks:  
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, 
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving de-
posits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning 
money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating 
notes.29
In the last three decades, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the principal regulator of national banks, has 
consistently interpreted the statutory language in a manner 
that has significantly expanded the outer boundaries of the 
“business of banking.”
 
30 Nevertheless, commercial banks re-
main subject to restrictive31 balance sheet regulation and are 
generally prohibited from engaging in non-banking activities.32
In addition to the statutory grants of only limited powers 
to banks, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks from 
participating in the securities dealing and underwriting busi-
ness and from affiliating with securities firms.
  
33 The Glass-
Steagall Act, however, did not preclude banks from affiliating 
with firms engaged in purely commercial activities. Only since 
the enactment of the BHCA in 1956, have companies that own 
or control U.S. banks34—BHCs—been subject to a separate set 
of legal restrictions on their business activities.35
 
United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 118–21 (2011). 
 The BHCA is 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012). 
 30. See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives 
Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1077 (2009). 
 31. See Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, Finance: Balance Sheet Bat-
tle, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b42fd1f6-ff7e 
-11e2-a244-00144feab7de.html#axzz2eJtL04gA. 
 32. Omarova, supra note 30, at 1050. 
 33. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 184–85 (1933) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 34. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2012). Although the definition of “control” for 
purposes of determining whether an entity is a BHC is complicated and fact-
dependent, the statute generally presumes the existence of “control” where an 
entity owns more than twenty-five percent of any class of voting shares of a 
bank. Id. § 1841(a)(2)(A). 
 35. Id. §§ 1841–1843. 
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the federal statute that most explicitly operationalizes the 
principle of separation of banking and commerce. It does so by 
restricting the permissible activities and investments of BHCs 
to banking, managing or owning banks, and a limited set of ac-
tivities determined to be “closely related to banking.”36 BHCs 
are required to register with, and become subject to an exten-
sive regime of consolidated regulation and supervision by, the 
Board.37 Thus, BHCs submit mandatory periodic reports to the 
Board, which has direct examination and enforcement authori-
ty over them.38 They are subject to capital adequacy regulation 
and must serve as a “source of strength” to their bank subsidi-
aries.39 Yet, it is the loss of legal authority to own a significant 
ownership stake in non-financial—and even many non-banking 
financial businesses—that is often viewed as the most severe 
consequence faced by any company that acquires a U.S. bank 
and thereby becomes a BHC.40
In effect, the entire system of U.S. bank and BHC regula-
tion is designed to keep institutions that are engaged in depos-
it-taking and commercial lending activities from conducting, di-
rectly or through some business combination, any significant 
non-financial activities, or from holding significant interests in 
any general commercial enterprise. The main arguments in fa-
vor of maintaining this legal wall between the “business of 
banking” and purely commercial business activities have tradi-
tionally included the needs to preserve the safety and sound-
ness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and effi-
cient flow of credit to productive economic enterprise, and to 
prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic pow-
er in the financial sector.
 
41
The safety and soundness argument generally posits that 
exposing federally insured depository institutions to the risks 
associated with manufacturing and commercial activities in-
creases the vulnerability of the banking and payments systems, 
the federal deposit insurance fund, and thereby the broader 
  
 
 36. Id. § 1843(c)(8). 
 37. Id. § 1844(a), (b). 
 38. Id. § 1844(c). 
 39. Adam Ashcraft, Are Bank Holding Companies a Source of Strength to 
Their Banking Subsidiaries?, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 273, 273–74 
(2008). 
 40. Schroeder, supra note 8 (suggesting Federal oversight is the biggest 
negative to becoming a BHC).  
 41. Separation, supra note 9, at 29–30, 46–47, 52 (discussing policy argu-
ments of maintaining a wall between banking and commerce). 
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economy. To the extent that this argument relies on an as-
sumption that all commercial activities are inherently more 
risky and volatile than purely financial activities, it may not be 
particularly convincing. There are also potential diversification 
benefits that may support allowing banks to invest, at least to 
some extent, in commercial enterprises. At the same time, 
however, some commercial activities may pose greater risks or 
require more specialized and expensive risk management and 
monitoring than others. Allowing banks to conduct such activi-
ties may therefore increase the exposure of the federal deposit 
insurance system to the ups and downs of unrelated commer-
cial markets. 
The need to ensure an impartial and efficient allocation of 
credit throughout the national economy provides another com-
pelling justification for disallowing the mixing of banking and 
commerce. Traditionally, one of the key policy concerns in this 
area has been the prevention of potential conflicts of interest. 
Affiliation with commercial companies may create powerful in-
centives for banks to make important lending decisions on the 
basis of such decisions’ potential impact on their commercial af-
filiates’ financial condition or profitability. Price discrimination, 
unfair restriction of access to credit, and other anti-competitive 
banking practices may not only hurt the individual commercial 
companies not affiliated with banks, but also significantly un-
dermine a nation’s economic productivity and growth. To date, 
empirical research has not produced definitive evidence either 
to support or to defeat this argument. As a plausible prudential 
policy concern, however, it remains an important factor. 
Perhaps the most compelling policy reason for institution-
alizing the separation of banking from commerce, especially 
through regulatory restrictions on BHCs’ activities, is the pre-
vention of excessive concentration of economic—and ultimately 
political—power in the hands of large financial-industrial con-
glomerates. In fact, the BHCA was originally designed princi-
pally as an antitrust, anti-monopoly law.42
  Bank holding company regulation in the United States historically 
has had two overriding goals: to prevent the unrestrained concentra-
tion of banking resources under the control of a single organization, 
and to prevent undue concentration of economic power that Congress 
perceived may result when banking and nonbanking enterprises com-
 According to the au-
thor of the leading treatise on the subject: 
 
 42. Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 9 STAN. L. REV. 333, 
346 (1957). 
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bine under the same corporate umbrella.43
This explicitly anti-monopoly policy focus of the BHCA has 
its roots in the long-standing American tradition of mistrust of 
“big business” and “high finance,” along with a corresponding 
preference for small, local business enterprise as a unit of eco-
nomic activity.
 
44 The very enactment of the BHCA was in sig-
nificant measure the product of successful political lobbying by 
small independent and community banks, trying to protect 
their local markets from potential competition from large out-
of-state banks.45 In recent decades, however, the political econ-
omy of the U.S. financial services sector has changed dramati-
cally, as a small number of large, internationally active finan-
cial conglomerates have become dominant economic and 
political actors in the industry.46 As part of this process, the 
original antitrust thrust of U.S. bank holding company regula-
tion has faded in significance and come to be largely forgotten.47
It should be noted, however, that in practice the relation-
ship between banking and commerce in the United States has 
long followed a non-linear and complex pattern, as the legal 
wall separating them has never been completely impenetra-
ble.
 
Yet, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, which exposed 
the potential systemic dangers of allowing unchecked growth of 
“too-big-to-fail” conglomerates, there is a strong argument for 
reviving and strengthening the policy of preventing excessive 
concentration of economic and political power in the financial 
services sector. From this perspective, it becomes particularly 
important to revisit the basis for, and the role of, the principle 
of separation of banking and commerce. 
48 Numerous exemptions from the general statutory re-
strictions on affiliations, such as the exemption for unitary 
thrift holding companies49
 
 43. MELANIE FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 7.02[1], at 
7-4 (3d ed. 2013). 
 or companies controlling certain 
 44. See MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 98–99 (1994). 
 45. For a discussion of the origins and history of the BHCA, see generally 
Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 113. 
 46. Id. at 124. 
 47. Id. at 123–24. 
 48. See Joseph G. Haubrich & João A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of 
Mixing Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. 
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 121, 122 (2003) (arguing that “bank-
ing and commerce in the United States has a convoluted and obscure history”). 
 49. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3) (2012). 
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state-chartered industrial banks,50 historically have allowed a 
wide variety of commercial firms to own and operate deposit-
taking institutions.51 Banks and BHCs, in turn, have always 
been allowed at least some degree of involvement in non-
financial activities, even if subject to various statutory and 
regulatory conditions and limitations. Not surprisingly, against 
that backdrop, the efficacy and desirability of the separation of 
banking and commerce as the principal method of achieving its 
stated policy goals—protecting the safety and soundness of the 
depository system, ensuring an impartial and efficient alloca-
tion of credit, and preventing an excessive concentration of eco-
nomic power—continue to be subjects of intense debates.52
B. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY EFFECT: PARTIAL MIXING OF 
BANKING AND COMMERCE  
  
In recent decades, fundamental changes in the nature and 
scope of financial intermediation have made the continuing rel-
evance of the separation of banking and commerce particularly 
salient. Beginning in the late 1970s, U.S. banks came under in-
creasing pressure to move away from the traditional spread-
driven banking business model, in response to the so-called 
process of “disintermediation.”53 As more lightly regulated in-
vestment banks began offering new products and services that 
competed with traditional banking products, banks sought to 
regain their profitability by expanding into capital markets.54
 
 50. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H). 
 
Technologically driven processes of financial innovation and 
globalization enabled financial institutions to continuously ex-
 51. General Electric is perhaps the best-known example of a unitary thrift 
holding company that combines industrial operations with a successful finan-
cial business run through its subsidiary, GE Capital. See Paul Glader, Is GE 
Capital Another CIT Waiting to Happen?, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. BLOG (July 17, 
2009, 10:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/07/17/tale-of-the-tape-cit-v 
-general-electric.  
 52. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Govern-
ance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Ja-
pan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 73–75 (1995); John R. Walter, 
Banking and Commerce: Tear Down This Wall?, ECON. Q., Spring 2003, http:// 
www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2003/spring/ 
walter.cfm.  
 53. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 125. 
 54. See Valentine V. Craig, Merchant Banking: Past and Present, FDIC 
BANKING REV. 29, 32–33 (2002) (discussing the evolution of banks’ capital in-
vestments). 
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pand their activities and sources of revenues.55
In this context, the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited 
BHCs from conducting lucrative securities trading and dealing 
activities, became the primary target of the banking industry’s 
deregulatory campaign.
  
56 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the 
industry’s lobbying efforts led to significant piecemeal erosion 
of the Glass-Steagall regime by regulatory action.57 During that 
period, the Board consistently relaxed statutory activity limita-
tions on BHCs, most notably by interpreting the Glass-Steagall 
Act to permit so-called “Section 20” subsidiaries of BHCs to un-
derwrite securities, as long as these activities generated no 
more than five percent of such subsidiaries’ revenues.58 By 
1996, the Board increased the revenue ceiling to twenty-five 
percent, thus allowing many BHCs to acquire regional invest-
ment banking firms.59
At the same time, the OCC engaged in parallel efforts to 
relax statutory restrictions on commercial banks’ activities, by 
ever more broadly interpreting the statutory term “business of 
banking.”
  
60 Perhaps most importantly, the OCC’s interpreta-
tions allowed U.S. banks to engage in an increasingly broad 
range of new derivatives activities, including trading and deal-
ing in derivatives instruments linked to various commodities.61
Finally, Congress partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act 
in enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the GLBA).
 
62 
The GLBA amended the BHCA to allow commercial banks and 
securities firms to affiliate under a newly-created FHC struc-
ture.63
 
 55. Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Fi-
nancial Innovation, and “Too Big to Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 529–30 
(2012). 
 Specifically, the main operative provision of section 4(k) 
of the BHCA, added by the GLBA, states that an FHC:  
 56. Id. at 518–19 (discussing the demise of the Glass-Steagall Act). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See FEIN, supra note 43, § 18-06[4], at 18-27 to 18-29. 
 59. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 764 (4th ed. 2011). 
 60. See Omarova, supra note 30, at 1077. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6801–6809 (2012)). 
 63. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2012). To become an FHC, a BHC has to meet 
a list of statutory criteria, the most important of which requires that the BHC 
itself and all of its deposit-taking subsidiaries are well-capitalized and well-
managed. Id.  
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may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares of 
any company engaged in any activity, that the Board . . . determines 
(by regulation or order)—  
 (A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or  
 (B) is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a sub-
stantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or 
the financial system generally.64
The main goal of the new regime was to allow an expansion 
of financial activities of banking organizations through organi-
zational affiliations. To make these business combinations via-
ble as a practical matter, the statute also authorized FHCs to 
conduct certain non-financial activities impermissible for mere 
BHCs not qualifying for that new regulatory status.
 
65
Three principal provisions of the GLBA enable FHCs to 
engage in commercial activities on a much broader scale than 
before. First, an FHC may make passive private equity invest-
ments of any size in any commercial company under the so-
called “merchant banking” authority.
 General-
ly, however, an FHC may acquire shares of any entity engaged, 
either exclusively or partly, in non-financial activities, only 
pursuant to a specific grant of statutory authority. 
66 Second, an FHC may di-
rectly engage in purely commercial activities determined to be 
“complementary” to a financial activity.67 Finally, Congress also 
provided a special grandfathering provision for commodity ac-
tivities of certain entities that become subject to the BHCA af-
ter the GLBA enactment.68
 
 64. Id.  
 Thus, while directly targeting the 
Glass-Steagall separation between commercial and investment 
banking, the GLBA also significantly undermined the broader-
reaching wall separating banking from commerce.  
 65. Unlike commercial banks, U.S. securities firms were not subject to 
prohibitions or restrictions on their business activities and were generally free 
to engage in any commercial activity. If forced to divest all of their pre-GLBA 
non-financial investments and assets, investment banks were unlikely to 
agree to any business combination with a BHC. 
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(7). 
 67. Id. § 1843(k)(1)(B). 
 68. Id. § 1843(o). The GLBA also added a separate section grandfathering 
a broader swath of non-financial activities of the entities that became subject 
to the BHCA (and elect the FHC status) after November 12, 1999. Id. 
§ 1843(n). A special sunset provision, however, required an FHC to terminate 
any such grandfathered commercial activities no later than November 12, 
2009, unless the Board extended the divestiture date for such an FHC for up 
to an additional five years (until November 12, 2014). Id. § 1843(n)(7). This 
statutory provision has little practical significance in the context of Goldman’s 
and Morgan Stanley’s current efforts to retain their commodity assets. 
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1. Financing Commerce: Merchant Banking Powers  
Prior to the enactment of the GLBA, a BHC was generally 
permitted to make passive private equity investments in any 
commercial company only if such investments did not exceed, 
in each case, five percent of such company’s voting securities.69 
The relatively low percentage ceiling on such permissible in-
vestments was designed primarily to ensure that BHCs did not 
acquire control of commercial entities and remained strictly 
passive investors in any such entities.70 The GLBA greatly ex-
panded the ability of certain qualifying BHCs—namely, those 
registering under the newly created category of FHCs—to make 
passive equity investments by granting FHCs so-called mer-
chant banking powers.71
The merchant banking authority permits an FHC to ac-
quire or control, directly or indirectly, up to 100% of any kind of 
ownership interest—including equity or debt securities, part-
nership interests, trust certificates, warrants, options, or any 
other instruments evidencing ownership—in any entity that 
engages in purely commercial, as opposed to financial, activi-
ties.
 
72 By creating this new investment authority, the GLBA 
enabled FHCs to conduct a broad range of securities underwrit-
ing, investment banking, and merchant banking activities, sub-
ject to statutory conditions and limitations. Most importantly, 
at the height of the high-tech stock boom, the GLBA’s grant of 
merchant banking powers allowed FHCs to compete with secu-
rities firms and venture-capital funds by investing in technolo-
gy start-ups.73
Historically rooted in the European tradition of trade fi-
nance, by the late 1990s, merchant banking denoted various 
forms of private equity investments, including leveraged buy-
outs and venture-capital funding of start-up companies.
 
74 Inter-
estingly, however, the statute does not define the term “mer-
chant banking.” In 2001, the Board and the Department of 
Treasury jointly issued a final rule implementing section 
4(k)(4)(H) of the BHCA (the Merchant Banking Rule).75
 
 69. Id. § 1843(c)(6)–(7). 
 The 
 70. 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (2013). 
 71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H), (7). 
 72. Id. § 1843(k)(4)(H). 
 73. Craig, supra note 54, at 33. 
 74. See id. at 29–30.  
 75. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8,466, 8,484–85 (Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.170 (2013)). 
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Merchant Banking Rule defines “merchant banking” activities 
and investments as those activities and investments that are 
not otherwise authorized under section 4 of the BHCA.76 In ef-
fect, the merchant banking power serves as a catch-all authori-
ty for FHCs to invest in commercial enterprises, as long as any 
such investment meets the following five requirements77
(1) the investment is not made or held, directly or indirect-
ly, by a U.S. depository institution (such as a bank subsidiary 
of the FHC);
: 
78
(2) the investment is made “as part of a bona fide under-
writing or merchant or investment banking activity,” which in-
cludes investments made “for the purpose of appreciation and 
ultimate resale”;
 
79
(3) the FHC either (i) is or has a securities broker-dealer 
affiliate, or (ii) has both (A) an insurance company affiliate that 
is predominantly engaged in underwriting life, accident and 
health, or property and casualty insurance (other than credit-
related insurance), or providing and issuing annuities and (B) a 
registered investment adviser affiliate that provides invest-
ment advice to an insurance company;
 
80
(4) the investment is held “only for a period of time to ena-
ble the sale or disposition thereof on a reasonable basis con-
sistent with the financial viability of the FHC’s merchant bank-
ing investment activities”;
 
81
(5) the FHC does not “routinely manage or operate” any 
portfolio company in which it made the investment, except as 
 and 
 
 76. 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(a) (2013). The Merchant Banking Rule provides 
the following definition: 
Section 4(k)(4)(H) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)) and this subpart authorize a financial holding com-
pany, directly or indirectly and as principal or on behalf of one or 
more persons, to acquire or control any amount of shares, assets or 
ownership interests of a company or other entity that is engaged in 
any activity not otherwise authorized for the financial holding com-
pany under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act. For purposes 
of this subpart, shares, assets or ownership interests acquired or con-
trolled under section 4(k)(4)(H) and this subpart are referred to as 
“merchant banking investments.” 
Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(i) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(d).  
 79. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(b). 
 80. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f). The merchant 
banking investment need not be held by or through the securities or insurance 
affiliates of the FHC. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.170(f). 
 81. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(a). 
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may be necessary in order to obtain a reasonable return on in-
vestment upon resale or disposition.82
The requirement that a permissible merchant banking in-
vestment be made as part of a bona fide underwriting or in-
vestment banking activity imposes an important functional 
limitation on merchant banking activities. Even though an 
FHC is permitted to acquire full ownership of a purely commer-
cial firm, the principal purpose of its investment must remain 
purely financial: making a profit upon subsequent resale or 
disposition of its ownership stake.
 
83 The Board made clear that 
merchant banking authority was not designed to allow FHCs to 
enter the nonfinancial business conducted by any portfolio 
company.84 This explicitly stated statutory requirement “pre-
serves the financial nature of merchant banking investment ac-
tivities and helps further the . . . purpose of maintaining the 
separation of banking and commerce.”85
Another important requirement that shapes the practical 
usefulness of the merchant banking authority to FHCs invest-
ing in commercial companies is the holding period for merchant 
banking investments, which is generally limited to a maximum 
of ten years.
 
86 If the investment is made through a qualifying 
private equity fund,87 the maximum holding period is fifteen 
years.88 In certain exigent circumstances, the FHC may petition 
the Board to allow it to hold the investment for some limited 
time in excess of the applicable holding period.89
Finally, the prohibition on FHCs’ involvement in the rou-
tine management and operation of portfolio companies they 
own or control under the merchant banking authority is de-
signed to serve as an additional safeguard against mixing 
banking and commerce. The Merchant Banking Rule lists the 
 Explicit limits 
on the duration of merchant banking investments underscore 
the principally financial nature of this activity. 
 
 82. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(a). 
 83. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8,466, 8,469 (Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2013)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1). 
 87. Id. § 225.173(a)(1)–(5).  
 88. Id. § 225.173(c)(1). 
 89. Id. § 225.172(b)(4). These extensions are meant to apply in situations 
where unfavorable market conditions or other circumstances would make it 
necessary or economically prudent for an FHC to temporarily postpone the re-
sale or disposition of the investment. See id. § 225.172(b)(5). 
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indicia of impermissible routine management or operation of a 
portfolio company, which include certain kinds of management 
interlocking90 and contractual restrictions on the portfolio com-
pany’s ability to make routine business decisions, such as hir-
ing non-executive officers or employees, or entering into trans-
actions in the ordinary course of business.91 Arrangements that 
do not constitute routine management or operation of a portfo-
lio company include contractual agreements restricting the 
portfolio company’s ability to take actions not in the ordinary 
course of business;92 providing financial, investment, and man-
agement consulting advice to, and underwriting securities of, 
the portfolio company;93 and meeting with the company’s em-
ployees to monitor or advise them in connection with the portfo-
lio company’s performance or activities.94 Importantly, the Mer-
chant Banking Rule specifically allows an FHC to elect any or 
all of the directors of any portfolio company, as long as the 
board of directors does not participate in the routine manage-
ment or operation of the portfolio company.95
 
 90. Id. § 225.171(a), (b)(1). An FHC is deemed to be engaged in the routine 
management or operation of a portfolio company if (1) any director, officer, or 
employee of the FHC or certain of its subsidiaries (including depository insti-
tutions, securities broker-dealers, and merchant banking subsidiaries) serves 
as, or has the responsibilities of, an executive officer of a portfolio company; or 
(2) any executive officer of the FHC or any of the same subsidiaries as men-
tioned above serves as, or has the responsibilities of, an officer or employee of 
the portfolio company. Id. § 225.171(b)(1). 
 
An FHC is presumed to be routinely managing or operating a portfolio 
company if:  
(i) any director, officer, or employee of the [FHC] serves as or has the 
responsibilities of [a non-executive officer] or employee of the portfolio 
company; or (ii) [a]ny officer or employee of the portfolio company is 
supervised by any director, officer, or employee of the [FHC] (other 
than in that individual’s capacity as a director of the portfolio compa-
ny). 
Id. § 225.171(b)(2). An FHC may rebut these presumptions by providing the 
Board with sufficient information showing the absence of routine management 
or operation. Id. § 225.171(c). 
 91. Id. § 225.171(b)(1). 
 92. Id. § 225.171(d)(2). 
 93. Id. § 225.171(d)(3)(i), (ii). 
 94. Id. § 225.171(d)(3)(iii). 
 95. Id. § 225.171(d)(1). The portfolio company must employ officers and 
employees responsible for routinely managing and operating its affairs. Id. 
§ 225.171(d)(1)(i). An FHC may engage, on a temporary basis, in the routine 
management or operation of a portfolio company only if such actions are nec-
essary to save the economic value of the FHC’s investment and to obtain a 
reasonable return on such investment upon its resale or disposition. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(4)(H)(iii) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(e)(1).  
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Despite their seemingly harsh tenor, these restrictions 
leave FHCs considerable flexibility in directing the affairs of 
their portfolio companies. The indicia of “routine management” 
focus mainly on specific personnel decisions and formalized ar-
rangements ceding control over ordinary-course business deci-
sions. Avoiding such formal indicia of “routinely managing” a 
portfolio company’s daily affairs, while retaining control over 
important substantive aspects of its business, presents little 
difficulty.96 The real question is whether, in practice, FHCs 
comply with the formal requirements of the Merchant Banking 
Rule while circumventing its intended purpose by using mer-
chant banking authority not to make purely financial invest-
ments in commercial companies but primarily as a means of 
engaging in impermissible commercial activities.97
2. Pure Commerce: “Complementary” Powers  
  
As discussed above, the main justification for allowing 
FHCs to own or control commercial companies under the mer-
chant banking authority is the notion of merchant banking as a 
fundamentally financial activity. However, the GLBA also con-
tains a separate grant of authority for FHCs to conduct activi-
ties that are clearly not financial in nature but are determined 
by the Board to be “complementary” to a financial activity.98 
The statute requires that the Board also determine that any 
such complementary activity “not pose a substantial risk to the 
safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial 
system generally.”99
Procedurally, the Board makes these determinations on a 
case-by-case basis. Any FHC seeking to acquire more than five 
percent of the voting securities of any class of a company en-
gaged in any commercial activity that the FHC believes to be 
complementary to a financial activity must apply for the 
Board’s prior approval by filing a written notice.
 
100
 
 96. Similarly, the holding period limitation may not be a deal-breaker for 
an FHC seeking commercial investments: ten years can be a long time horizon 
in today’s financial markets.  
 In the no-
 97. This is an empirical question that requires a qualitative analysis of 
individual FHC’s use of merchant banking authority and the nature of its re-
lationship with portfolio companies. It is not clear whether the Board current-
ly collects such data. 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).  
 99. Id. 
 100. 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a) (2013). The FHC applies for approval by filing at 
least a sixty-day prior notice in accordance with section 4(j) of the BHCA. 12 
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tice, the FHC must specifically describe the proposed commer-
cial activity; identify the financial activity for which it would be 
complementary and provide detailed information sufficient to 
support a finding of “complementarity”; describe the scope and 
relative size of the proposed activity (as measured by the ex-
pected percentages of revenues and assets associated with the 
proposed activity); and discuss the risks the proposed commer-
cial activity “may reasonably be expected” to pose to the safety 
and soundness of the FHC’s deposit-taking subsidiaries along 
with the risk management measures the FHC would take to 
minimize such risks.101
The notice must also describe the public benefits that en-
gaging in the proposed activity “reasonably can be expected to 
produce.”
  
102 In making its determination, the Board is required 
to make a specific finding that the proposed activity would pro-
duce public benefits that outweigh its potential adverse ef-
fects.103 The statutory list of such public benefits includes 
“greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in effi-
ciency.”104 The Board must balance these benefits against such 
dangers as “undue concentration of resources, decreased or un-
fair competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking prac-
tices, or risk to the stability of the United States banking or fi-
nancial system.”105
The legislative history of this provision shows that the in-
dustry deliberately sought the inclusion of the “complementary” 
clause as an open-ended source of legal authority for banking 
organizations to engage in any commercial activities that may 
become feasible or potentially profitable in the future. In con-
gressional hearings, financial services industry representatives 
stressed “the importance of having the flexibility to engage in 
nominally commercial activities, particularly those related to 
technology and telecommunications, that support and comple-
ment [their] core business.”
  
106
 
U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a).  
 This is how then Vice-Chairman 
 101. 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a)(1)–(5). 
 102. Id. § 225.89(a)(6). 
 103. Id. § 225.89(b)(3).  
 104. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A). 
 105. Id. This list essentially reiterates the policy concerns underlying the 
principle of separation of banking from commerce. See supra Part I.A.  
 106. The Financial Services Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 172 (1998) (pre-
pared statement of John G. Heimann, Chairman, Global Financial Institu-
tions, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., on behalf of the Financial Services Council). 
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of J.P. Morgan & Co. described the industry’s vision of “com-
plementary” business activities:  
  The world of finance has changed. Information services and tech-
nological delivery systems have become an integral part of the finan-
cial services business. Financial firms use overcapacity in their back 
office operations by offering services to others such as telephone help 
lines or data processing for commercial firms. These activities may 
not be strictly “financial,” yet they utilize a financial firm’s resources 
and complement its financial capabilities in a manner that is benefi-
cial to the firm without adverse policy implications.  
  Financial firms also engage in activities that arguably might be 
considered non-financial, but which enhance their ability to sell fi-
nancial products. One example is American Express, which publishes 
magazines of interest to its cardholders—Food & Wine and Travel & 
Leisure. Travel & Leisure magazine is complementary to the travel 
business (an activity permitted within the definition of financial in 
H.R. 10) in that it gives customers travel ideas which the company 
hopes will lead to ticket purchases and other travel arrangements 
through American Express Travel Services. Similarly, Food & Wine 
promotes dining out, as well as purchases of food and wine, all of 
which might lead to greater use of the American Express Card. These 
activities are complementary to financial business and thus should be 
permissible for financial holding companies.107
The industry’s frequent references to Travel & Leisure and 
Food & Wine magazines effectively framed the congressional 
debate on “complementary” activities as a debate about rela-
tively low-risk, low-profile activities, such as publishing and fi-
nancial data dissemination. In reality, however, the possibility 
of having a flexible, undefined statutory category of permissible 
commercial activities was especially attractive to financial in-
stitutions seeking to take advantage of the dot-com boom and 
potentially expand into far riskier Internet ventures.
 
108 From 
the industry’s perspective, an intentionally open-ended “com-
plementary” authority was the key to such an expansion.109
 
 107. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10 
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 294–95 (1999) 
(prepared testimony of Michael E. Patterson, Vice Chairman, J.P. Morgan & 
Co., Inc., on behalf of the Financial Services Council). 
  
 108. As the CEO of Bank One Corp. put it, “[t]he area on the commerce 
side that is most interesting to me is what is happening on the Internet.” The 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the 
H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 18 (1999) (testimony of 
John B. McCoy, President and CEO, Bank One Corporation). 
 109. Straying from the magazine-publishing story line, Chairman and CEO 
of Merrill Lynch explained the industry’s need for definitional flexibility as 
follows: 
[O]ne of our concerns was . . . to retain the ability to make invest-
ments in Silicon Valley for research and development and for access 
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In April 1999, the Senate introduced its version of the re-
form bill that for the first time included the “complementary 
powers” provision.110 In June 1999, the House bill was amended 
to incorporate a similar authorization of “complementary” ac-
tivities but only “to the extent that the amount of such com-
plementary activities remains small in relation to the author-
ized activities to which they are complementary.”111
The Board has described the intended scope and purpose of 
its own authority to approve certain activities as complemen-
tary to an FHC’s financial activity in relatively cautious terms, 
as allowing individual FHCs to do the following: 
 This 
express limitation disappeared from the final version enacted 
into law as part of the GLBA, leaving the Board free to set its 
own conditions for FHCs’ complementary activities. 
[T]o engage, to a limited extent, in activities that appear to be com-
mercial if a meaningful connection exists between the proposed com-
mercial activity and the FHC’s financial activities and the proposed 
commercial activity would not pose undue risks to the safety and 
soundness of the FHC’s affiliated depository institutions or the finan-
cial system.112
Curiously, between 2000 and 2012, the Board used its au-
thority almost exclusively to approve physical commodity and 
energy trading activities as complementary to FHCs’ financial 
activity of trading in commodity derivatives.
 
113
 
to systems and technology. If we had had this conversation three to 
five years ago, this would have been the furthest thing from our 
minds and something we certainly at that time would not been in-
volved in nor had very much interest in being involved in. 
 It seems that, 
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before 
the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 23–24 (1999) (testimo-
ny of David Komansky, Chairman and CEO, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.). 
 110. S. 900, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999) (as placed on the Senate calendar, 
Apr. 28, 1999). The Democratic members of the Senate’s Banking Committee 
unanimously voted against the bill as significantly weakening the separation 
of banking and commerce. S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 54, 73 (1999). They specifical-
ly criticized the Republican majority’s new “complementary” clause as too 
open-ended and unnecessary. Id. at 75. 
 111. H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999) (as reported by H. Comm. on Bank-
ing & Financial Services, June 15, 1999) (internal citations omitted). An earli-
er House Committee Report included a similar provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 
106-74, pt. 1, at 5 (1999).  
 112. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 68 Fed. Reg. 
68,493 (Dec. 9, 2003) (emphasis added). 
 113. See infra Part II.B. It appears that, as of mid-2013, the Board ap-
proved only one other type of activity—certain disease management and mail-
order pharmacy services—as complementary to a financial activity of under-
writing and selling health insurance. See 93 Fed. Res. Bull. C133–36 (2007). 
Wellpoint, which was not a BHC, submitted an application to the FDIC to ob-
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after the GLBA was enacted, FHCs discovered that trading 
crude oil and wholesale electricity “complemented” their tradi-
tional financial activities much better than publishing travel 
and culinary magazines. This phenomenon raises critical ques-
tions about the scope and practical operation of the undefined 
and intentionally broad statutory concept of “complementarity.” 
3. A Special Kind of Commerce: Grandfathered Commodities 
Activities 
In addition to granting FHCs potentially broad and vague-
ly defined merchant banking and “complementary” powers, the 
GLBA contains a special grandfathering provision for commodi-
ties activities.114 Section 4(o) of the BHCA explicitly authorizes 
any company that becomes an FHC after November 12, 1999, 
to continue conducting “activities related to the trading, sale, or 
investment in commodities and underlying physical proper-
ties,”115
(1) the company “lawfully was engaged, directly or indirect-
ly, in any of such activities as of September 30, 1997, in the 
United States”;
 subject to the following conditions:  
116
(2) the aggregate consolidated assets of the company at-
tributable to commodities or commodity-related activities, not 
otherwise permitted to be held by an FHC, do not exceed five 
percent of the company’s total consolidated assets (or such 
higher percentage threshold as the Board may authorize);
 
117
(3) the company does not permit cross-marketing of prod-
ucts and services between any of its subsidiaries engaged in the 
grandfathered commodities activities and any affiliated U.S. 
depository institution.
 
and 
118
This is a very curious provision that, to date, has remained 
 
 
tain deposit insurance for its new Utah-chartered industrial bank. Id. at C133. 
Although owning an industrial bank would not make Wellpoint a BHC subject 
to the BHCA’s activity restrictions, Wellpoint had to request the Board’s de-
termination because, at the time, the FDIC-imposed temporary moratorium on 
providing deposit insurance to new industrial banks prohibited approval of 
any such applications unless the applicant (Wellpoint, in this instance) en-
gaged exclusively in FHC-permissible activities. See Moratorium on Certain 
Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg. 5,290 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
 114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. § 1843(o)(1). 
 117. Id. § 1843(o)(2). 
 118. Id. § 1843(o)(3)(A), (B). 
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largely unnoticed and rarely, if ever, invoked or discussed in 
public discourse or legal analysis. Yet, as discussed below, this 
provision is poised to become a potentially critical factor in re-
drawing the line between banking and commerce in the post-
crisis era.119 The vague phrasing of this section seems to allow a 
qualifying new FHC to conduct not only virtually any kind of 
commodity trading but also any related commercial activities 
(for example, owning and operating oil terminals and metals 
warehouses), if it engaged in any commodities business—even 
if on a very limited basis and/or involving different kinds of 
commodities—prior to the 1997 cut-off date.120 Potentially, such 
a broadly stated exemption may open the door for large finan-
cial institutions to conduct sizeable commercial activities of a 
kind typically not allowed for banking organizations.121
To date, the outer limits of the commodities grandfathering 
clause have not been tested. It is difficult to assess, therefore, 
whether and to what extent this seemingly inconspicuous pro-
vision may be used to deal the final death blow to the principle 
of separation of banking and commerce. The legislative history 
of this special grandfathering clause, however, provides valua-
ble context in which to place analysis. It is also highly instruc-
tive from the point of view of the political economy of U.S. fi-
nancial services regulation.  
 
The grandfathering of pre-existing commodities trading ac-
tivities was originally proposed in 1995 by Congressman Jim 
Leach as part of a broader set of provisions establishing a new 
charter for “wholesale financial institutions” (WFIs), which 
could conduct a wide range of banking activities but, im-
portantly, could not take federally-insured retail deposits.122
 
 119. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 
Under the proposal, companies that owned or controlled one or 
more WFIs (but not FDIC-insured banks)—Wholesale Finan-
cial Holding Companies (WFHCs)—would be regulated and su-
 120. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o). 
 121. The statutory five percent limit on the FHC’s total consolidated assets 
attributable to the grandfathered commodities activities is designed to prevent 
a dramatic shift in the business profile of such an FHC from financial to pure-
ly commercial commodities activities. In absolute terms, however, even such a 
small fraction of total consolidated assets of a large FHC may allow for a con-
siderable expansion of its commercial business of owning, producing, trans-
porting, processing, and trading physical commodities. Such an expansion may 
very well implicate the fundamental policy concerns underlying the principle 
of separation of banking and commerce. 
 122. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, 104th 
Cong. § 109 (1995) (version 1). 
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pervised by the Board but less stringently than regular 
FHCs.123 These provisions of the House bill were designed spe-
cifically to create a so-called “two-way street” for investment 
banks to enable them to acquire commercial banks and offer 
their institutional clients wholesale banking services without 
becoming subject to the full range of activity restrictions under 
the BHCA.124 Because WFIs and their parent companies—
dubbed “woofies”—would not have access to federal deposit in-
surance and, therefore, were not likely to pose any significant 
potential threat to the deposit insurance fund, the proposal au-
thorized them to engage in a broader set of non-financial activi-
ties than regular FHCs backed by FDIC insurance. One of the-
se explicit trade-offs involved the grandfathering of woofies’ 
pre-existing commodities trading and related activities.125
Curiously, both Goldman and J.P. Morgan were among the 
big banks and securities firms that strongly pushed for the pas-
sage of the “woofie” charter.
  
126 The proposal, however, became a 
subject of intense political contention in Congress.127
 
 123. Id. In the 1995 versions of the House bill, these WFI holding compa-
nies were referred to as “Investment Bank Holding Companies.” Compare H.R. 
1062, 104th Cong. § 109 (1995) (version 1), with H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 131 
(1998) (version 3, exemplifying the difference in terminology).  
 In contrast 
 124. This is how an American Bankers Association report described the 
1997 proposal: 
  To allow for two-way affiliations between banks and securities 
firms, a new type of holding company would be permitted. This would 
be the investment bank holding company. These companies would 
have still wider powers than the new bank holding company format 
would bring, but the separation between banking and commerce 
would still be retained. These special holding companies could own 
wholesale financial institutions (WFIs, also known as "woofies") 
which would be uninsured but also not subject to standard bank hold-
ing company firewalls. 
Steve Cocheo, Outlook Brightens for New Banking Laws, 89 A.B.A. BANKING J. 
10, 10 (1997). 
 125. Goldman lobbied for specific inclusion of the commodity grandfather-
ing clause in the “woofie” provisions of the House bill because of its existing 
investment in J. Aron, a commodity trading company. In fact, at the time, the 
commodity grandfathering provision was “widely viewed as the ‘Goldman’ ex-
ception.” Martin E. Lybecker, Financial Holding Companies and Financial 
Activities Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in BACK TO THE FUNDA-
MENTALS: INSURANCE REGULATION, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION, AND IN-
VESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION H-81 n.11 (ABA-CLE ed., 2001). 
 126. Dean Anason, Capital Briefs: Wholesale Banking Cut from Reform 
Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1999, at 2; Leslie Wayne, Push for Wholesale Banks 
Stalls in Overhaul of Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at C2. 
 127. Some of the most intense battles arose out of the ideologically divisive 
issue of applicability of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to “woofies.” 
Ultimately, this controversy became one of the main reasons for defeating the 
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to the House bill, the Senate version of the reform legislation 
did not contain “woofie” provisions.128 In April 1999, however, 
Senator Phil Gramm introduced an amendment that effectively 
replicated the commodity grandfathering provision for 
“woofies” in the House bill—but without any reference to 
“woofies.”129 In the Conference, the entire subtitle of the House 
bill dealing with “woofies” was dropped.130 The Senate’s broader 
version of the commodity-grandfathering clause, however, re-
mained in the text of the GLBA and became the current section 
4(o) of the BHCA.131 Thus, an initially limited concession to fi-
nancial institutions that were explicitly denied access to federal 
deposit insurance became an open-ended exemption available 
to all newly-registered FHCs fully backed by the federal gov-
ernment guarantees.132
To sum up, the GLBA created significant opportunities for 
U.S. banking organizations to play a much more direct and ac-
tive role in purely commercial sectors of the economy—and, es-
pecially, in energy and commodities markets. How did this le-
gal and regulatory relaxation of the restrictions on mixing 
banking and commerce affect individual FHCs’ actual business 
strategies? Did this country’s biggest banking organizations 
take advantage of their new powers to break down this venera-
ble wall? Or does the GLBA provide an effective framework for 
restraining the expansion of large financial conglomerates’ 
commercial activities in practice? A closer look at U.S. FHCs’ 
involvement in the trading of physical commodities provides a 
fascinating glimpse of possible answers to these questions. 
 
II.  WHAT WE SEE: BANKING ORGANIZATIONS’ ENTRY 
INTO PHYSICAL COMMODITIES AND ENERGY TRADING   
This Part examines the process of steady regulatory expan-
 
proposal. Dean Anason, Reform Panel Approves Packet of Resolutions, but 
Tough Issues Await, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30, 1999, at 2; Dean Anason, Reform 
Vote Called Off as Republicans Battle CRA, AM. BANKER, Sept. 4, 1998, at 1. 
The media also reported at the time that investment banks initially lobbying 
for the “woofie” charter, over time, lost interest in the concept, partly because 
some of them were acquired by large BHCs and others decided that the new 
legislation was evolving in a favorable direction even without the “woofie” pro-
visions. See Wayne, supra note 126. 
 128. See S. 900, 106th Cong. (1999) (as placed on the Senate calendar, Apr. 
28, 1999). 
 129. S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 3 (1999).  
 130. Anason, supra note 126, at 2. 
 131. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012). 
 132. See id. 
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sion of the scope of FHC-permissible activities in commodity 
and energy markets between the enactment of the GLBA and 
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. During this peri-
od, several large FHCs successfully obtained regulatory ap-
provals to trade physical commodities as an activity comple-
mentary to commodity derivatives trading.133
Crucially, however, the system of regulatory reporting has 
not been updated to reflect these developments. Contrary to 
what one might expect, there is no meaningful public disclosure 
of banking organizations’ assets and activities related to physi-
cal commodities and energy. Hence, it is important to preface 
the discussion by explaining why the American public does not 
yet have a full picture of what is happening in this space. 
 
A. WHY OUR VISION IS OBSCURED: A NOTE ON THE 
INFORMATIONAL GAP 
There are several reasons why the existing public disclo-
sure regime is inadequate to assess the nature and scale of fi-
nancial institutions’ physical commodity trading operations.  
The first difficulty is that publicly-traded financial institu-
tions—including all of the largest FHCs—typically report their 
assets, revenues, profits, and other financial information for 
the entire business segment, of which commodities trading is 
only a part. For instance, Goldman includes commodities in its 
Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities (FICC) division, 
which is included in the firm’s Institutional Client Services 
business segment.134 The same is true of Morgan Stanley, which 
includes commodities operations in its Fixed Income and Com-
modities (FIC) division within the Institutional Securities 
business segment.135
 
 133. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006); Barclays 
Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (2004); UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 
(2004). 
 Neither firm provides full financial infor-
 134. Goldman Sachs Grp, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 1–4 (Feb. 28, 
2012) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K]. The firm’s Institutional 
Client Services activities are organized by asset class and include both “cash” 
and “derivative” instruments. Id. Cash instruments refer to trading in the as-
sets underlying derivative contracts, such as “a stock, bond or barrel of oil.” Id. 
at 3. The firm’s annual report does not provide details on their physical com-
modity operations and simply lists commodity products FICC trades: “Oil and 
natural gas, base, precious and other metals, electricity, coal, agricultural and 
other commodity products.” Id. at 4. The report states that FICC generally fa-
cilitates client transactions and makes markets in commodities. Id. at 115.  
 135. Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2–3 (Feb. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K]. According to the company’s descrip-
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mation attributable specifically to its commodities divisions.  
The second difficulty is that, to the extent FHCs include in 
their regulatory filings financial information specific to their 
commodities operations, such information usually pertains to 
both commodity-linked derivatives operations and trading in 
physical commodities. As a result, most financial information 
reported under the “commodities” rubric relates to the deriva-
tives business, leaving one to guess what is going on in the 
firms’ physical commodities businesses.136
Currently, large FHCs are required to report to the Board, 
on a quarterly basis, only one financial metric directly related 
to their physical commodities operations: the gross market val-
ue of physical commodities in their trading inventory.
 Because of this re-
porting pattern, industry analysts’ estimates of the revenues or 
profits generated by large FHCs’ commodities trading desks of-
ten include the estimated revenues and profits from purely fi-
nancial transactions in commodity derivatives. More broadly, 
this disclosure format tends to de-emphasize—and thus make 
even less visible—the fact that financial institutions often act 
not only as dealers in purely financial risk but also as tradi-
tional commodity merchants. 
137
 
tion of its activities: 
 These 
  The Company invests and makes markets in the spot, forward, 
physical derivatives and futures markets in several commodities, in-
cluding metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil, 
oil products, natural gas, electric power, emission credits, coal, 
freight, liquefied natural gas and related products and indices. The 
Company is a market-maker in exchange-traded options and futures 
and OTC options and swaps on commodities, and offers counterpar-
ties hedging programs relating to production, consumption, re-
serve/inventory management and structured transactions, including 
energy-contract securitizations and monetization. The Company is an 
electricity power marketer in the U.S. and owns electricity-generating 
facilities in the U.S. and Europe. 
Id. at 3. 
 136. For example, in its financial statements for the quarterly period ended 
March 31, 2012, Goldman reported the revenue from commodities instruments 
(both derivative and non-derivative) as $471 million, compared to $957 million 
for the same period in 2011. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report Pur-
suant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, For the 
Quarterly Period Ended March 31, 2012 (Form 10-Q), at 13 (May 9, 2012) 
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-Q]. Similarly, Goldman reported 
the average daily Value at Risk (VaR) measure for the commodity prices risk 
category (including both financial and cash commodity instruments) as $26 
million for the three months ended March 31, 2012, compared to $37 million 
for the same quarterly period in 2011. Id. at 155.  
 137. See CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPA-
NIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D (“Trading Assets and Liabilities”), Item 
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mandatorily reported data may provide at least a hint of the 
potential scale of these activities. For instance, a look at this 
line item in JPMC’s filings reveals a significant growth in the 
market value of physical commodities the company holds for 
trading purposes. Thus, as of March 31, 2009, JPMC reported 
the gross fair value of physical commodities in its inventory as 
a relatively modest $3.7 billion.138 By September 30, 2009, the 
amount had doubled to $7.9 billion.139 By the end of 2009, the 
number had further increased to slightly over $10 billion.140 At 
the end of 2010, the reported amount reached above $21 bil-
lion.141 As of December 31, 2011, JPMC reported the gross fair 
value of physical commodities in its inventory at approximately 
$26 billion.142 As of March 31, 2012, the gross fair value of phys-
ical commodities in JPMC’s inventory had slightly decreased to 
$17.2 billion.143 At the end of 2012, that number was $16.2 bil-
lion.144
Morgan Stanley’s regulatory filings show that, as of March 
31, 2009, the gross fair value of physical commodities it held in 
inventory was slightly below $2.5 billion.
 
145
 
M.9.a(2) (“Gross fair value of physical commodities held in inventory.”). Form 
FR Y-9C is a quarterly report filed with the Board by BHCs with total consoli-
dated assets of $500 million or more, which the Board is authorized by statute 
to require. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 225.5(b) (2013). 
 The reported value 
of this line item in Morgan Stanley’s reports rapidly increased 
 138. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Mar. 31, 2009). 
 139. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Sept. 30, 2009). 
 140. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2009). 
 141. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2010). 
 142. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2011). 
 143. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Mar. 31, 2012).  
 144. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2012). 
 145. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Mar. 31, 
2009). 
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to $10.3 billion as of September 30, 2011,146 before going slight-
ly down to approximately $9.6 billion as of March 31, 2012.147 
At the end of 2012, the gross fair value of physical commodities 
in Morgan Stanley’s inventory was about $7.3 billion.148
Goldman’s filings show more fluctuations in the gross fair 
value of physical commodities in the firm’s inventory during 
the same three-year period. Specifically, as of March 31, 2009, 
Goldman reported $1.2 billion in this line item.
 
149 At the end of 
the next quarter, the number fell to $682 million.150 It peaked 
at the end of 2010 at over $13 billion.151 As of March 31, 2012, 
Goldman reported the gross fair value of its physical commodi-
ties inventory at $9.5 billion.152 At the end of 2012, Goldman’s 
number rose to $11.7 billion.153
As issuers of publicly traded securities, FHCs include the 
same data in their quarterly reports filed with the SEC.
 
154 The 
gross market value of FHCs’ physical commodity trading inven-
tory, however, measures solely their current exposure to com-
modity price risk.155
 
 146. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Sept. 30, 
2011). 
 It does not provide a full picture of these 
organizations’ actual involvement in the business of producing, 
 147. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Mar. 31, 
2012). 
 148. MORGAN STANLEY, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) (Dec. 31, 
2012). 
 149. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Mar. 31, 2009). 
 150. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(June 30, 2009). 
 151. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2010). 
 152. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Mar. 31, 2012). 
 153. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-D, Item M.9.a(2) 
(Dec. 31, 2012). 
 154. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-Q, supra note 136, at 18. 
 155. Similarly, the VaR data included in FHCs’ SEC filings provide a 
measure of their exposure to commodity price risk. See id. at 154 (“VaR is the 
potential loss in value of inventory positions due to adverse market move-
ments over a defined time horizon with a specified confidence level.”). 
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extracting, processing, transporting, or storing physical com-
modities. To a great extent, this nearly exclusive regulatory fo-
cus on commodity price risk reflects the underlying assumption 
that U.S. banking organizations do not conduct any commodity-
related activities that could potentially pose any additional 
risks to their safety and soundness or create systemic vulnera-
bilities. If one assumes that banking organizations act only as 
arms’ length buyers and sellers of physical commodities, strict-
ly for the purpose of providing financial risk management ser-
vices to their clients, then it is logical to conclude that sudden 
price fluctuations in commodity markets are the main source of 
potential risk from such activities. In the absence of detailed 
information on U.S. banking organizations’ actual commodities 
assets and operations, however, this assumption becomes dan-
gerously unreliable.156
Gaps in the current system of public disclosure and regula-
tory reporting explain the near-absence of reliable, detailed da-
ta on the precise nature and full scope of U.S. banking organi-
zations’ physical commodity operations. The traditional lack of 
transparency in global commodity markets and the inherently 
secretive nature of the commodity trading industry create a 
third source of difficulties for understanding what exactly U.S. 
FHCs do, and how significant their role is, in these markets. A 
handful of large, mostly Switzerland-based commodities trad-
ing houses—including Glencore,
  
157 Vitol,158 Trafigura,159 
Mercuria,160 and Gunvor161
 
 156. There may be ways to collect some information on FHCs’ physical 
commodities activities from a wide variety of diverse sources, including statis-
tical records maintained by the Department of Energy (DOE), FERC, or other 
non-financial regulators. However, theoretical availability of these disparate 
data does not cure the fundamental informational deficiency in this area. Even 
if it can be located, with significant effort, such amalgamation of data is not 
likely to create a complete and reliable picture of large FHCs’ commodity op-
erations and assets.  
—dominate the global trade in oil 
 157. Switzerland-based Glencore is the world’s largest independent com-
modity trading company with significant production assets. See At a Glance, 
GLENCOREXSTRATA, http://www.glencorexstrata.com/about-us/at-a-glance (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 158. Switzerland-based Vitol is one of the largest independent oil and gas 
trading companies in the world. See About Vitol, VITOL, http://www.vitol.com/ 
about-vitol.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 159. See About Us, TRAFIGURA, http://www.trafigura.com/about-us (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 160. See Business Development, MERCURIA, http://www.mercuria.com/about 
-us/business-development (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 161. Switzerland-based Gunvor is co-founded and co-owned by a Russian 
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and gas, petroleum products, coal, metals, and other prod-
ucts.162 Nearly all of these publicity-shy commodities trading 
firms are privately owned.163 They do not publicly report results 
of their financial operations and generally refrain from disclos-
ing information about the structure or performance of their in-
vestments. Secrecy has always been an important attribute of 
the traditional commodities trading business, in which access 
to information is vital to commercial success, and having in-
formational advantage often translates into windfall profits.164 
Given this lack of transparency and secretive nature of the 
commodities trading business, it is nearly impossible for an in-
dustry outsider—and even for most insiders—to gauge accu-
rately the relative size and importance of U.S. FHCs as traders 
and dealers in the global markets for physical commodities.165
 
oil tycoon, Gennady Timchenko, whose reported close ties to Russia’s Presi-
dent Putin gave rise to many speculations as to the true reasons for the com-
pany’s success. See Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Gunvor, Putin and Me”—Oil Trader 
Speaks Out, REUTERS, May 22, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2008/05/22/us-putin-gunvor-idUSL228794620080522; From Petrograd 
to Petrodollars, THE ECONOMIST, May 5, 2012, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21554184. See generally GUNVOR GROUP, 
  
http://gunvorgroup.com (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 162. Javier Blas, Trading Houses: Veil Slowly Lifts on a Secretive Profes-
sion, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8028cb0-84cf 
-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dOuRafF9 [hereinafter Blas, Trading 
Houses]. 
 163. Jack Farchy, Commodity Houses Court Outside Investors, FIN. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b0b982c-8dee-11e1-bbae-00144f 
eab49a.html. A rare exception to this rule is Glencore, which became a public-
ly traded company in May 2011. See History, GLENCOREXSTRATA, http:// 
www.glencorexstrata.com/about-us/history (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 164. Blas, Trading Houses, supra note 162.  
 165. This is especially true of oil and gas markets. Currently, the markets 
for trading crude oil and oil products are dominated by three groups of players: 
major oil companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and British Petroleum), inde-
pendent commodity trading houses (Vitol, Gunvor, Glencore, Trafigura, and 
Mercuria), and financial institutions (Morgan Stanley and Goldman). See GATI 
AL-JEBOURI, LITASCO SA, INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKETS AND OIL TRADING 6 
(2008), available at http://www.litasco.com/_library/pdf/social_acts/ 
international_oil_market_and_oil_trading.pdf. Although these three types of 
oil traders have significantly different business structures and profiles, they 
have been converging in some important respects. Thus, the trading arms of 
oil majors and commodity trading houses have been developing active finan-
cial derivatives trading and dealing capabilities to supplement their tradition-
al operations in physical markets. Recent media reports indicate that inde-
pendent commodity trading companies have also been acquiring both 
upstream (oil production) assets and downstream (refining and processing) 
assets. See Javier Blas, Commodities Traders Face Growing Pains, FIN. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ae89836-8f78-11e1-9ab1-00144f 
eab49a.html#axzz2dOuRafF9; Blas, Trading Houses, supra note 162. It is 
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Nevertheless, even with these powerful blinders obscuring 
our vision, we can start tracing the path that led U.S. banking 
organizations to their current prominence in physical commodi-
ties markets. As it often happens in the banking world, the first 
step on that path was made possible by a seemingly routine 
regulatory agency action.  
B. LET’S GET PHYSICAL: THE SCOPE OF FHCS’ 
“COMPLEMENTARY” POWERS  
Even before the enactment of the GLBA, U.S. commercial 
banks and their affiliates had become actively involved in trad-
ing and dealing in financial derivatives—publicly-traded fu-
tures and various over-the-counter contracts—linked to the 
prices of commodities.166 Since the mid-1980s, the OCC has 
been aggressively interpreting the bank powers clause of the 
National Bank Act to include derivatives trading and dealing 
as part of the “business of banking.”167
Handling physical commodities, however, was a much dif-
ferent matter. Even physical settlement of permissible com-
modity derivatives—which necessitated taking ownership, 
transporting, and storing actual crude oil or iron ore—
presented a problem in light of the general principle of separat-
ing banking from commerce. Despite industry lobbying, the 
Board refused to add the acceptance and delivery of physical 
commodities to the list of activities “closely related to banking” 
when it amended Regulation Y in 1997.
 Similarly, under the 
BHCA, trading in commodity derivatives is generally treated as 
a financial activity that raises no controversial legal issues.  
168
 
nearly impossible, however, to ascertain how big or important financial insti-
tutions’ physical oil- and gas-trading operations are vis-à-vis the other two 
groups, in large part because that would require access to potentially sensitive 
non-public information on the oil companies’ and trading houses’ operations 
and activities. In an informal interview with the author, a professional oil in-
dustry consultant who wished to remain anonymous claimed that even a 
rough estimate would require a lot of sophisticated and prohibitively expen-
sive investigative work not dissimilar to industrial espionage. For obvious rea-
sons, such investigation does not appear to be feasible for the purposes of this 
Article. 
 By that time, the 
OCC was already allowing national banks to take delivery of 
physical commodities by warehouse receipt or on a “pass-
through” basis, as part of hedging otherwise permissible com-
 166. See generally Omarova, supra note 30. 
 167. Id. 
 168. FEIN, supra note 43, § 18.07[6], at 18–38. 
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modity derivatives transactions.169 The Board explained its re-
luctance to grant broad authority for BHCs to engage in physi-
cally settled commodity transactions by citing “issues involving 
risk management policies and procedures that are more appro-
priately addressed through the application review process.”170
In the early 2000s, global commodities markets began ex-
periencing a sharp and sustained rise in prices, building up to a 
major commodity boom. According to the World Bank, between 
2003 and 2008, “[a]verage commodity prices doubled in U.S. 
dollar terms (in part boosted by dollar depreciation), making 
this boom longer and stronger than any boom in the 20th cen-
tury.”
  
171
In 2003, the Board finally amended Regulation Y’s “laun-
dry list” of permissible non-banking activities to allow BHCs to 
accept or “make delivery of title to commodities underlying de-
rivative contracts on an instantaneous, pass-through basis.”
 The beginning of this unprecedented commodity price 
boom coincided with the increased push by large U.S. financial 
institutions to establish large-scale physical commodity trading 
operations.  
172 
The amended Regulation Y, however, imposes conditions on 
BHCs’ authority to engage as principals in physically settled 
commodity derivatives, to ensure that a BHC would not take 
physical possession of the underlying commodity.173
 
 169. Omarova, supra note 
 These con-
ditions reflect the Board’s apparent unease with granting 
30, at 1085–87. 
 170. Federal Reserve System, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,290, 9,311–12 (Feb. 28, 1997) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2013). 
 171. THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2009: COMMODI-
TIES AT THE CROSSROADS 51 (2009), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF-w47.pdf. Although 
commodity prices fell sharply in late 2008 as a result of the unfolding credit 
crisis, they recovered strongly between 2009 and 2011, rising almost to their 
peak 2008 levels. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 
JANUARY 2012, COMMODITY ANNEX 1 (2012), available at http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1322593305595/8287139 
-1326374900917/GEP2012A_Commodity_Appendix.pdf.  
 172. Federal Reserve System, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,807, 39,808 (July 3, 2003) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225). 
 173. Id. Regulation Y explicitly requires that a BHC either make every 
reasonable effort to avoid physical delivery or effect delivery by instantaneous 
transfer of title to a third party, without taking physical possession of the un-
derlying commodity. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8) (2013). In addition, the derivative 
contract must allow for assignment, termination, or offset prior to delivery. Id. 
In the absence of such provisions, the contract must be approved for trading 
on a U.S. contract market (even though it may not be actually traded on any 
futures exchange) by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Id. 
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BHCs a blanket authority to engage in activities so closely re-
sembling those of commodity merchants. 
Thus, while trading in commodity derivatives is a financial 
activity permissible for FHCs, trading in the physical commodi-
ties underlying such derivatives transactions generally consti-
tutes an impermissible commercial activity even in the post-
GLBA era. FHCs seeking to engage in physical trades must 
find a specific legal authority to do so. Just as the global com-
modity markets were entering the period of unprecedented 
price rises, several large U.S. FHCs and foreign banks success-
fully obtained Board orders allowing them to trade physical 
commodities as an activity complementary to the financial ac-
tivity of trading and dealing in commodity derivatives. 
1. Permissible Physical Commodities Trading 
In 2003, Citigroup became the first to receive Board ap-
proval of its physical commodities trading as a “complemen-
tary” activity.174 Under the Board’s order, Citigroup was al-
lowed to purchase and sell oil, natural gas, agricultural 
products, and other non-financial commodities in the spot mar-
ket and to take and make physical delivery of commodities to 
settle permissible commodity derivative transactions.175 The 
Board based its determination on four main considerations. 
First, the Board found that the proposed activities “flowed” 
from FHCs’ legitimate financial activities, essentially providing 
them with an alternative method of fulfilling their obligations 
under otherwise permissible derivatives transactions.176 Se-
cond, permitting these activities would make FHCs more com-
petitive vis-à-vis other financial firms not subject to regulatory 
restrictions on physically settled derivatives transactions.177 
Third, the proposed activities would enable FHCs to offer a full 
range of commodity-related services to their clients in a more 
efficient manner.178 Finally, conducting physical commodity ac-
tivities would enhance FHCs’ understanding of the commodity 
derivatives market.179
 
 174. Citigroup Inc., Order Approving Notice to Engage in Activities Com-
plementary to a Financial Activity, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 508 (2003) [hereinafter 
Citigroup Order]. 
  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 509. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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To minimize the safety and soundness risks that this type 
of commercial activity may pose, the Board imposed a number 
of conditions on Citigroup’s commodity-trading business. First, 
the market value of any commodities owned by Citigroup may 
not exceed five percent of its consolidated Tier 1 capital.180 This 
market value limitation is generally meant to ensure that phys-
ical commodity trading does not grow too big, at least in rela-
tive terms.181 Second, unless the Board specifically allows oth-
erwise, Citigroup may take or make delivery only of those 
commodities for which derivatives contracts have been ap-
proved for trading on U.S. futures exchanges by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).182 This requirement was 
designed to prevent Citigroup from dealing in finished goods 
and other items, such as real estate, which lack the fungibility 
and liquidity of exchange-traded commodities.183 Third, the 
Board made clear that Citigroup must conduct its physical 
commodity trading business in compliance with the applicable 
securities, commodities, and energy laws.184
Finally, the Citigroup Order stated that the FHC was not 
“authorized to (i) own, operate, or invest in facilities for the ex-
traction, transportation, storage, or distribution of commodi-
ties; or (ii) process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.”
 
185 
The expectation was that Citigroup would use storage and 
transportation facilities owned and operated by unrelated third 
parties.186
 
 180. Id. If the market value of physical commodities held by Citigroup as a 
result of its commodity-trading activities exceeds four percent of its consoli-
dated Tier 1 capital, Citigroup has to notify the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY). In 2003, Citigroup reported its total consolidated Tier 1 capital 
of nearly $66.9 billion. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 89 
(Dec. 31, 2003). This puts the numerical limit for the market value of the phys-
ical commodities held by Citigroup for 2003 at slightly above $3.1 billion. Id. 
 The purpose of this important limitation is to mini-
mize non-financial risks inherent in physical commodity trad-
ing: storage risk, transportation risk, and potentially serious 
environmental and legal risks associated with these activi-
 181. Citigroup Order, supra note 174, at 5. It is difficult to eliminate some 
degree of arbitrariness in setting this threshold, however. Generally, the “five-
percent” limit seems to be a particularly popular numerical marker that ap-
pears in various contexts in federal bank regulation. It is not entirely clear 
why this magic number is especially reasonable in any particular context. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 6. 
 184. Id. at 8. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 7. 
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ties.187 The Board relied on specific representations from 
Citigroup to the effect that it would exercise heightened care in 
avoiding these non-financial risks. Thus, Citigroup represented 
that it would require the owner of any vessel carrying oil on 
behalf of Citigroup to carry the maximum insurance for oil pol-
lution available from a protection and indemnity club and to 
obtain a substantial amount of additional pollution insur-
ance.188 Similarly, it promised to require all third-party storage 
facilities to carry a significant amount of oil pollution insurance 
from a creditworthy insurance company.189 Citigroup would also 
place age limitations on vessels and develop a comprehensive 
backup plan in the event any owner of a vessel or storage facili-
ty fails to respond adequately to an oil spill.190
In subsequent years, the Board granted similar orders au-
thorizing physical commodity trading activities on the part of 
FHCs and foreign banks treated as FHCs for purposes of the 
BHCA. These grants of complementary powers allowed large 
non-U.S. banks—such as UBS,
 
191 Barclays,192 Deutsche Bank,193 
and Société Générale194—to expand their worldwide physical 
commodities businesses by adding U.S. operations, albeit on a 
somewhat limited scale. In 2005, JPMC also obtained an order 
permitting the FHC to engage in physical commodity trading 
activities as complementary to its booming financial derivatives 
business.195
In 2008, The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), then the U.K.’s 
largest banking group, received the Board’s order authorizing a 
 In all of these cases, the Board imposed the same 
standard set of conditions and limitations originally articulated 
in the Citigroup Order. 
 
 187. Id. at 6. For example, one can imagine a situation in which an explo-
sion aboard an oil tanker, owned or operated by one of Citigroup’s subsidiar-
ies, results in multiple human injuries and deaths, loss of property, failure to 
fulfill contractual obligations to third parties, and significant environmental 
damage—all of which would expose Citigroup to private lawsuits, regulatory 
enforcement actions, and even criminal liability.  
 188. Id. at 7. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. UBS AG, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 215 (2004). 
 192. Barclays Bank PLC, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 511 (2004). 
 193. Deutsche Bank AG, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C54 (2006). 
 194. Société Générale, 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C113 (2006). 
 195. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 92 Fed. Res. Bull. C57 (2006). Bank of 
America and Wachovia received Board approvals to conduct physical commod-
ities trading in 2006–07. See Letter from Board to Bank of Am. Corp. (Apr. 24, 
2007); Letter from Board to Wachovia Corp. (Apr. 13, 2006). 
  
304 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:265 
 
wide range of physical commodities and energy trading activi-
ties as complementary to RBS’s financial derivatives activi-
ties.196 RBS sought these expanded powers in connection with 
its acquisition of a fifty-one percent equity stake in a joint ven-
ture with Sempra Energy, a U.S. utility group.197 The joint ven-
ture, RBS Sempra Commodities (RBS Sempra), was set up to 
conduct a worldwide business of trading in various physical 
commodities—including oil, natural gas, coal, and non-precious 
metals—and be an active player in power markets in Asia and 
North America.198
In the RBS Order, the Board significantly relaxed the 
standard limitations and expanded the scope of permissible 
trading in physical commodities. Thus, the Board allowed RBS 
to take and make physical deliveries of nickel, even though 
nickel futures were not approved for trading on U.S. futures 
exchanges by the CFTC. The Board reasoned that contracts for 
nickel were actively traded on the LME, a major non-U.S. ex-
change subject to regulation comparable to the regulation of the 
U.S. futures exchanges.
 
199 The Board also authorized physical 
trading in a long list of physical commodities—including natu-
ral gasoline, asphalt, kerosene, and other oil products and pet-
rochemicals—despite the fact that contracts for these commodi-
ties have not been approved for trading on any major 
exchange.200 In authorizing physical trading in these commodi-
ties, the Board relied on the fact that these commodities were 
fungible and that contracts for them were traded in sufficiently 
liquid over-the-counter markets (through individual brokers 
and on alternative trading platforms).201
Although previous orders prohibited FHCs from refining or 
processing commodities they traded, the Board authorized RBS 
to hire third parties to refine, blend, or otherwise alter the 
commodities.
  
202
 
 196. The Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. plc, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C60 (2008) 
[hereinafter RBS Order]. 
 In effect, this removed the ambiguity in previ-
ous orders by explicitly allowing RBS, for example, to sell crude 
 197. Philip Aldrick, RBS Buys Majority Stake in Sempra, TELEGRAPH, Jul. 
10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2811893/RBS-buys 
-majority-stake-in-Sempra.html.  
 198. Id. 
 199. RBS Order, supra note 196, at C62–C63. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. “Fungibility” means that market participants contract for stated 
quantities but cannot specify the exact product or lot they want to receive. Id. 
 202. Id. at C61. 
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oil to an oil refinery and then buy back the refined oil product. 
The Board determined that this activity essentially posed the 
same risks as hiring a third party to operate a storage or 
transportation facility, as permitted under previous orders.203 
In addition, RBS made a specific commitment that it would not 
have exclusive rights to use the alteration facility.204
The Board also authorized RBS to enter into long-term 
electricity supply contracts with large industrial and commer-
cial customers. The Board noted that, while most commodities 
traded by FHCs were limited to wholesale markets, electric 
power could much more easily reach small retail customers.
 
205 
To ensure that RBS remained a wholesale electric power in-
termediary dealing only with sophisticated customers, the RBS 
Order specified the minimum consumption levels for customers 
to whom RBS was allowed to sell electricity on a long-term ba-
sis.206
2. Energy Management and Energy Tolling 
 
The RBS Order is especially noteworthy as an example of a 
large FHC expanding the scope and nature of its energy busi-
ness beyond the traditional model of buying and selling com-
modities. In the RBS Order and in two separate orders issued 
to a Belgian-Dutch bank, Fortis, the Board specifically ap-
proved so-called energy management and energy tolling ser-
vices they sought to perform in the United States.207
These orders authorized RBS and Fortis to provide certain 
energy management services—consisting of transactional and 
advisory services—to owners of power generation facilities un-
der Energy Management Agreements (EMA).
  
208 FHC-
permissible energy management services generally entail act-
ing as a financial intermediary for a power plant owner to facil-
itate purchases of fuel and sales of power by the plant, as well 
as advising the owner on risk-management strategies.209
 
 203. Id. at C64. 
 Thus, 
the energy manager—Fortis or RBS—would buy fuel for the 
 204. Id. at C67. 
 205. Id. at C64. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Fortis S.A./N.V., 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C20 (2008) [hereinafter Fortis Or-
der]; RBS Order, supra note 196; Letter from Board to Fortis S.A/N.V. (May 
21, 2008) [hereinafter Fortis Board Letter]. 
 208. See Fortis Order, supra note 207, at C20. 
 209. Id. 
  
306 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:265 
 
plant from third parties and sell it to the plant in a mirror 
transaction. It would then purchase the power generated by the 
plant and resell it in the market.210 In effect, the energy man-
ager would provide credit and liquidity support for the plant 
owner, including the posting of any required collateral for 
transactions.211 In addition, the manager also would assume re-
sponsibility for administrative tasks in connection with, and 
the hedging of exposure under, fuel and power transactions.212
FHC-permissible energy management services, however, 
are subject to several conditions designed to limit the safety 
and soundness risks of such activities. Thus, the Board re-
quired that the revenues attributable to the FHC’s energy 
management services not exceed five percent of its total consol-
idated operating revenues.
  
213 The Board also required that all 
EMAs, pursuant to which the FHC engages in these activities, 
include certain mandatory provisions. For example, the EMA 
must mandate that the plant owner approve all contracts for 
purchases of fuel and sales of electricity, although the owner 
may be allowed to grant a standing authorization to the man-
ager to enter into contracts that meet certain owner-specified 
criteria.214 The owner must retain responsibility for the day-to-
day maintenance and management of the power generation fa-
cility, including hiring employees to operate it. The owner must 
also retain the right to (i) market and sell power directly to 
third parties, although the manager may have the right of first 
refusal; and (ii) determine the facility’s power output level at 
any given time.215 In addition, the FHC is prohibited, directly or 
through its subsidiaries, from guaranteeing the financial per-
formance of the power plant and from bearing any risk of loss if 
the plant is not profitable.216
Energy tolling is generally similar to energy management. 
The Board authorized RBS and Fortis to enter into energy toll-
  
 
 210. Id. at C21. 
 211. Id. 
 212. The administrative tasks include, among other things, arranging for 
third parties to provide fuel transportation or power transmission services, 
coordinating fuel purchases and power sales, negotiating and monitoring con-
tracts with the plant owner’s counterparties. See Fortis Order, supra note 207.  
 213. Id. at C22. This revenue limit is the functional equivalent of the mar-
ket value limit the Board imposed on physical commodities activities. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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ing agreements that have certain characteristics.217 Under the-
se arrangements, an FHC (the toller) makes fixed periodic 
(usually, monthly) “capacity payments” to the power plant 
owner, to compensate the owner for its fixed costs, in exchange 
for the right to all or part of the plant’s power output.218 The 
plant owner retains control over the day-to-day operation of the 
power plant. The toller pays for the fuel needed to produce the 
power it directs the owner to produce. The owner receives a 
marginal payment for each megawatt hour produced by the 
plant, as compensation for its variable costs plus a profit mar-
gin.219
similar to a call option on the power produced by the plant with a 
strike price linked to fuel and power prices. In general, the toller 
would direct the operator to run the plant (i.e., the toller would exer-
cise its option) when the price of power exceeds the cost of producing 
that amount of power. Some tolling agreements may also give the tol-
ler the right to a plant’s excess capacity, which the toller may sell to 
the market or use to meet reliability obligations to the power grid.
 As the Board explained it, the toll is: 
220
The Board approved energy tolling as a complementary ac-
tivity because it is an “outgrowth” of the relevant FHC’s per-
missible commodity derivatives activities.
  
221
C. THE BOUNDARIES OF “COMPLEMENTARITY” 
 It reasoned that 
permitting energy tolling would provide the FHC with valuable 
information on the energy markets, which would help it to 
manage its own commodity risk. It would also allow the FHC to 
compete more effectively with other financial firms not subject 
to the BHCA.  
An overview of the Board’s grants of complementary pow-
ers to FHCs to engage in physical commodities and energy 
trading activities reveals an inherent flaw in the regulatory 
concept of “complementarity” that, in effect, fails to impose 
meaningful limits on the expansion of banking organizations’ 
commercial businesses.  
Under the Board’s pre-crisis decisions, the main limitation 
on FHCs’ complementary powers to engage in physical com-
modities and energy activities is the regulatory requirement 
that FHCs not own, operate, or invest in the facilities for ex-
traction, transportation, storage, and distribution of commodi-
 
 217. See RBS Order, supra note 196; Fortis Board Letter, supra note 207. 
 218. See RBS Order, supra note 196, at C64. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (internal formatting omitted). 
 221. Id. at C65. 
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ties. Under these orders, FHCs generally have to lease, rent, or 
charter such facilities. It appears that this is where the Board 
draws the line, out of its (at this point, apparently residual) 
concern about allowing FHCs to get directly involved in purely 
commercial activities. The Fortis and RBS Orders, however, 
raise an interesting question about the real impact of this pro-
hibition. Thus, the energy management and tolling arrange-
ments described in these orders look very much like the func-
tional equivalent of owning a power generating facility. Even 
with all of the Board-mandated contractual provisions guaran-
teeing a certain role for the plant owner, these agreements give 
the FHCs control over the plant’s operation and output. In ef-
fect, the FHC obtains a contractually captive power generator, 
which allows it to build or expand its business supplying elec-
tricity under long-term contracts in wholesale power markets.  
How “complementary” would this type of wholesale power 
marketing business be to any financial activity of RBS or For-
tis? As the Board emphasized, a complementary activity must 
have some “meaningful connection” to a bona fide financial ac-
tivity of an FHC, and a grant of complementary powers must 
enable the FHC to engage in commercial activities only “to a 
limited extent.”222 The Board approved these energy trading ac-
tivities and other physical commodities trading because they 
naturally “flow” or “grow out of” the BHC-permissible electrici-
ty and commodity-linked derivatives trading.223 Yet, this argu-
ment is too superficial to be convincing. Any number of com-
mercial activities can be connected to trading and dealing in 
derivatives, by virtue of the simple fact that derivatives can be 
linked to any asset.224
 
 222. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 68 Fed. Reg. 
68,493 (Dec. 9, 2003). 
 That this type of “complementarity” is 
 223. Id. 
 224. For example, if an FHC trades in weather derivatives, does that mean 
the FHC can also build and operate satellites and radar systems used in mete-
orological forecasting as a complementary activity? Can that FHC also own 
construction companies that build homes able to withstand severe storms in 
hurricane-prone areas? Conveniently, the same FHC, through a bank subsidi-
ary, can also provide financing to purchasers of such homes and perhaps in-
sure those homes and securitize the loans. These would be purely financial ac-
tivities that could serve as a starting point for a new set of the FHC’s 
“complementary” commercial business activities. The same logic may be ap-
plied to envision a new chain of commercial and financial activities plausibly 
connected to derivatives referencing a different asset category. At some point, 
a list of commercial activities potentially related to some form of a derivative 
product would probably grow to encompass the entire universe of economic en-
terprise. 
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used to justify banking organizations’ direct involvement in 
power generation and marketing reveals something very im-
portant about the role of derivatives trading as a bank-
permissible activity. Trading and dealing in these infinitely 
malleable instruments, which effectively translate every eco-
nomic value into quantifiable financial risk, seems to have cre-
ated an instant set of potential synergies with every conceiva-
ble economic activity. Taken at face value, the familiar 
arguments about the benefits to the banking institutions of be-
ing able to engage in commercial activities that “naturally” flow 
out of their derivatives activities raise a fundamental policy 
question: if such connection is truly necessary, should banking 
institutions be allowed to trade in derivatives? To put it boldly, 
may unlimited trading and dealing in derivatives—or, at least, 
certain kinds of derivatives—be potentially inconsistent with 
the principle of separating banking from commerce? Although 
these complex policy issues are beyond the scope of this Article, 
they highlight a critical flaw in the amorphous notion of “com-
plementarity.” 
It is worth noting that FHCs began actively seeking ex-
panded authority to conduct physical commodities and energy 
trading activities in the early 2000s—soon after the fall of En-
ron, the pioneer in financializing commodity and energy mar-
kets.225 It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to wheth-
er there is a direct causal connection between these 
phenomena. Yet, one can identify at least one key link in this 
respect: the rise, in the wake of Enron’s failure, of Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley, then independent investment banks, as 
top players in global markets for physical commodities and en-
ergy. Their preeminence as commodity derivatives dealers and 
access to cheap and plentiful credit and liquidity gave Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley key advantage over large energy compa-
nies that attempted to replicate Enron’s initial success.226 These 
two firms, which at the time were not subject to the BHCA’s ac-
tivity restrictions, were also Citigroup’s and JPMC’s main com-
petitors in the commodity derivatives space.227
 
 225. Shiela McNulty, Speculators Return in Wake of Enron, FIN. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24cd3dcc-1b74-11e1-8647-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2gX8IEQC5. 
 In authorizing 
 226. Large energy companies, including Dynegy and Duke Energy, tried to 
follow Enron’s model by combining large-scale physical and derivatives trad-
ing but failed due mainly to capital constraints and limited access to credit 
necessary for sustaining it. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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FHCs to trade in physical commodities, the Board meant to 
remedy their competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Goldman and 
Morgan Stanley. 
Of course, before the autumn of 2008, nobody could imag-
ine that both of these institutions would voluntarily become 
BHCs, in the midst of a major financial crisis—and that their 
conversion would bring the salience of U.S. banking institu-
tions’ commodity trading activities to a whole new level. 
III.  WHAT WE DON’T (YET) SEE: HOW THE CRISIS 
CHANGED THE PHYSICAL COMMODITIES TRADING 
GAME   
One of the most profound and least appreciated conse-
quences of the recent financial crisis is the emergence of a pow-
erful trio of large FHCs with extensive physical commodities 
business operations: Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC. 
Two extraordinary crisis-driven phenomena led to this result: 
the emergency conversion of Morgan Stanley and Goldman into 
BHCs and the once-in-a-lifetime acquisition by JPMC of the 
commodity assets of two failing institutions, Bear Stearns and 
RBS. 
On September 21, 2008, Morgan Stanley and Goldman re-
ceived approval to register as BHCs subject to the Board’s regu-
lation and supervision, in a desperate effort to bolster investor 
confidence and avoid potential creditor run on their assets.228
JPMC followed a different route to the top of the Wall 
Street commodities game. In 2008, the firm acquired the physi-
cal commodity trading assets of failing Bear Stearns.
 In 
the midst of the unfolding crisis, the Board approved these 
firms’ applications to become BHCs almost literally overnight, 
without putting them through its normal, lengthy and detailed 
review process. It is highly unlikely that, at the time of the 
conversion, the Board focused on these firms’ extensive physi-
cal commodities assets and activities—or gave full considera-
tion to the question of how to deal with such activities in the 
long run.  
229
 
 228. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C101, C102, 2008 WL 
7861871, at *4 (Nov. 1, 2008); Morgan Stanley, 94 Fed. Res. Bull. C103, C105, 
2008 WL 7861872, at *5 (Sept. 21, 2008). 
 In 2009-
2010, JPMC bought the global commodities business of nation-
 229. Morgan Stanley May Sell Part of Commods Unit: CNBC, REUTERS, 
June 6, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/us 
-morganstanley-commodities-idUSBRE8550ND20120606 [hereinafter CNBC]. 
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alized RBS.230 In a few short years, the firm’s aggressive growth 
strategy transformed it into one of the three biggest U.S. bank-
ing organizations dominating global commodity markets.231
Thus, in the wake of the financial crisis, the Board finds it-
self facing a qualitatively different commodities business con-
ducted by three of the largest U.S. banking organizations. Un-
der the BHCA, a newly-registered BHC has up to five years 
from the registration date either to divest its impermissible 
non-banking activities or to bring such activities into compli-
ance with BHCA requirements.
  
232
As discussed above, general news and business media re-
ports remain the main source of publicly available information 
on FHCs’ activities in physical commodities and energy mar-
kets.
 The statutory five-year grace 
period for the non-conforming commodity activities of Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley ends in the fall of 2013, at which point the 
Board must make a potentially fateful decision whether these 
firms will be able to continue—and further expand—their 
commodity and energy merchant businesses. This decision, 
however, requires a thorough understanding of the nature and 
scope of these institutions’ actual involvement in physical 
commodities and energy markets. 
233
A. MORGAN STANLEY AND GOLDMAN SACHS: PLAYING FOR THE 
NEW CLUB 
 Based primarily on the analysis and synthesis of media 
reports, the following sections describe what is publicly known 
about the nature and scope of the physical commodities activi-
ties of the three FHCs with the largest presence in that space: 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC. 
Prior to their emergency conversion into BHCs in Septem-
ber 2008, Goldman and Morgan Stanley were independent in-
vestment banks with extensive equity investments in various 
commercial businesses.234
 
 230. Id. 
 Even among their peers, however, 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley stood out as the “original ‘Wall 
Street refiners’ that pioneered the modern energy derivatives 
 231. Id. Among non-U.S. financial institutions, only UK’s Barclays and 
Germany’s Deutsche Bank currently compete with Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
and JPMC in global commodity markets. Id. 
 232. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (2012). 
 233. See supra Part II.A.  
 234. CNBC, supra note 229. 
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market two decades ago.”235 In addition to their dominant posi-
tion as major dealers in commodities derivatives, both firms 
have established themselves as the key players in the produc-
tion, processing, transportation, storage, and trading of a wide 
range of physical commodities.236
Both Morgan Stanley and Goldman began actively expand-
ing their physical commodity operations in the early 2000s, in 
response to the commodity price boom.
  
237 There are two main 
reasons for this expansion. First, direct participation in the 
production and marketing of physical commodities yields cru-
cial informational advantages for these firms’ derivatives trad-
ing business.238 Continuous access to inside information on cur-
rent price trends in the commodity spot markets enhances their 
ability to price and trade commodity-linked derivatives in the 
most profitable ways. Physical assets—pipelines, tankers, ter-
minals, and warehouses—are “invaluable tools for traders.”239 
According to a former Morgan Stanley trader, “[i]t’s as if you 
are a traffic cop sitting in the middle of an intersection, you see 
everything go by.”240
Second, the steady upward trend in global commodities 
prices since the early 2000s, going hand in hand with the in-
creasing flow of financial investors’ money into the sector, made 
physical commodity trading potentially a lucrative business in 
its own right.
 
241
In practice, it is difficult to separate these two rationales 
for a firm like Goldman or Morgan Stanley to get involved in 
global commodity trading business. Until recently, the two 
firms seemed to pursue relatively different strategies in this 
area. Throughout the 1990s, Goldman focused primarily on 
commodity-linked derivatives, while Morgan Stanley built 
strong physical commodities trading operations.
 Buying, selling, storing, and moving commodi-
ties can generate handsome profits in a world that depends on 
the flow of these commodities for its very survival.  
242
 
 235. Id.  
 The latest 
 236. Id. 
 237. Jeanine Prezioso, Morgan Stanley Latest US Bank to Lose Traders to 
Merchant Firm, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/06/morganstanley-mercuria-traders-idUSL2E8K67QA2012 
0906. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Javier Blas, Commodities Trading Loses Its Goldman Queen, FIN. 
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commodity price boom made these differences less meaningful, 
as Goldman moved aggressively into the physical space.243
Even after becoming FHCs subject to the BHCA, Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley remain the top players in both derivatives 
and physical commodity markets.
  
244
1. Morgan Stanley: Oil, Tankers, and Pipelines 
 This change in their regu-
latory status, however, fundamentally altered the broader con-
text of U.S. bank holding company regulation and elevated to a 
new, previously unseen level the inherent tension between the 
principle of separation of banking and commerce, on the one 
hand, and the reality of large FHCs’ growing commercial em-
pires, on the other. 
During the years preceding the latest financial crisis, Mor-
gan Stanley built a significant business trading in oil, gas, elec-
tric power, metals, and other commodity products.245 According 
to industry estimates, Morgan Stanley’s commodities unit gen-
erated $17 billion in revenue over the past decade, trading both 
financial contracts and physical commodities.246 Unlike its 
archrival Goldman, however, Morgan Stanley “has remained 
resolutely a merchant-trader, focusing on the business of stor-
ing or transporting raw materials.”247 According to a 2008 re-
search report, traditional client “flow” business—market-
making, selling indices to investors, and commodity risk hedg-
ing—constituted only about ten to fifteen percent of the firm’s 
commodities activities.248 About half of Morgan Stanley’s com-
modities business is reportedly in crude oil and oil products, 
while about forty percent is in power and gas.249
Morgan Stanley has been using physical assets in trading 
  
 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ec8af7f0-3d02-11e1-ae07 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eJIq1WUk. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, 2012 GREENWICH LEADERS: OTC 
COMMODITIES DERIVATIVES (2012); Alexander Osipovich, Risk and Energy 
Risk—2012 Commodity Rankings—Energy, RISK.NET (Feb. 9, 2012), http:// 
www.risk.net/energy-risk/research/2144918/risk-energy-commodity-rankings 
-2012-energy. 
 245. CNBC, supra note 229. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Matthew Robinson & Scott DiSavino, Deal or No Deal, Morgan Stan-
ley Commodity Trade Shrinks, REUTERS, Jun. 7. 2012, available at http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/morganstanley-commodities-idUSL1E8H757V 
20120607. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  
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energy and commodities since the mid-1980s.250 In the early 
1990s, Morgan Stanley’s oil trader, Olav Refvik, struck deals to 
buy and deliver oil and oil products to large commercial users 
around the globe and earned the nickname “King of New York 
Harbor” for accumulating a record number of leases on storage 
tanks at the key import hub, which gave the firm a great mar-
ket advantage.251 During the same period, Morgan Stanley con-
structed power plants in Georgia, Alabama and Nevada, which 
allowed it to become a major electricity seller.252
In the mid-2000s, Morgan Stanley began aggressively ex-
panding its energy infrastructure investments, especially in oil 
and gas transportation and logistics. In 2006, Morgan Stanley 
acquired full ownership of Heidmar Inc., a Connecticut-based 
global operator of commercial oil tankers.
  
253 Although Morgan 
Stanley sold fifty-one percent of equity in 2008, it still retained 
a forty-nine percent stake.254 Heidmar operates a fleet of more 
than 100 double-hull vessels and provides transportation and 
logistics services to major oil companies around the world.255
In September 2006, Morgan Stanley acquired, in a lever-
aged buyout, the full ownership of TransMontaigne Inc., a 
Denver-based oil-products transportation and distribution 
company.
  
256 TransMontaigne markets “unbranded gasoline, 
diesel fuel, heating oil, marine fuels, jet fuels, crude oil, residu-
al fuel oils, asphalt, chemicals and fertilizers.”257 The company 
is affiliated with a fuel terminal facility operator, TransMon-
taigne Partners L.P., which operates oil terminals in twenty-
seven U.S. states and Canada.258
 
 250. Ann Davis, Morgan Stanley Trades Energy Old-Fashioned Way: In 
Barrels, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2005, at A1.  
 In 2005, the last year Trans-
Montaigne was a publicly-listed company, it reported revenues 
of about $8.6 billion and assets of slightly less than $1.2 bil-
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Company History, HEIDMAR, http://www.heidmar.com/history (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 254. Id.  
 255. What We Do: Commercial Management, HEIDMAR, http://www 
.heidmar.com/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 256. TRANSMONTAIGNE PARTNERS L.P., 1,750,000 COMMON UNITS REPRE-
SENTING LIMITED PARTNER INTERESTS S-2 (Prospectus Supp. 2010). 
 257. About TMG, TRANSMONTAIGNE, http://www.transmontaigne.com/ 
about-tmg (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 258. TransMontaigne is the general partner of TransMontaigne Partners 
L.P., a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership. Id. 
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lion.259 Forbes estimated the company’s 2011 revenues at $12 
billion.260
Both Heidmar and TransMontaigne are subsidiaries of 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (MS Capital Group), Mor-
gan Stanley’s commodities and energy trading arm through 
which it holds equity stakes in multiple commodity business-
es.
 
261
  In connection with the commodities activities in our Institutional 
Securities business segment, we engage in the production, storage, 
transportation, marketing and trading of several commodities, includ-
ing metals (base and precious), agricultural products, crude oil, oil 
products, natural gas, electric power, emission credits, coal, freight, 
liquefied natural gas and related products and indices. In addition, 
we are an electricity power marketer in the U.S. and own electricity 
generating facilities in the U.S. and Europe; we own TransMontaigne 
Inc. and its subsidiaries, a group of companies operating in the re-
fined petroleum products marketing and distribution business; and 
we own a minority interest in Heidmar Holdings LLC, which owns a 
group of companies that provide international marine transportation 
and U.S. marine logistics services.
 According to Morgan Stanley’s own description of its phys-
ical commodities business activities in its SEC filings:  
262
The SEC filings of TransMontaigne Partners, the only pub-
licly-traded subsidiary of MS Capital Group and TransMon-
taigne, provide a fascinatingly detailed picture of one signifi-
cant facet of Morgan Stanley’s physical commodities business: 
“oil terminaling and transportation.”
 
263 TransMontaigne Part-
ners owns and operates a vast infrastructure, including numer-
ous crude oil and refined products pipelines and terminals 
along the Gulf Coast, in the Midwest, in Texas, along the Mis-
sissippi and Ohio Rivers, and in the Southeast.264
 
 259. See Fortune 500 2006, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ 
fortune/fortune500/snapshots/1452.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (ranking 
America’s largest corporations).  
 The company 
receives refined oil products and liquefied natural gas from cus-
tomers via marine vessels, ground transportation, or pipelines; 
stores customers’ products in its tanks located at the terminals; 
monitors the volume of stored products in its tanks; provides 
 260. #21 TransMontaigne, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/21/ 
private-companies-11_TransMontaigne_7I0O.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) 
(excluding the revenues generated by the company’s publicly-traded subsidiar-
ies). 
 261. Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at exh. 21.  
 262. Id. at 27. 
 263. TransMontaigne Partners L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10–11 
(Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter TransMontaigne Partners, Form 10-K]. 
 264. Id. at 12–19. 
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product heating and mixing services; and transports the refined 
products out of its terminals for further distribution.265
In 2011, TransMontaigne Partners earned over $152 mil-
lion in revenues, of which almost $107 million came from its af-
filiates.
  
266 The company’s primary customers are its indirect 
parent entities, MS Capital Group and TransMontaigne.267
  Morgan Stanley Capital Group is a leading global commodity 
trader involved in proprietary and counterparty-driven trading in 
numerous commodities markets including crude oil and refined prod-
ucts, natural gas and natural gas liquids, coal, electric power, base 
and precious metals and others. Morgan Stanley Capital Group has 
been actively trading crude oil and refined products for over 20 years 
and on a daily basis trades millions of barrels of physical crude oil 
and refined products and exchange-traded and over-the-counter crude 
oil and refined product derivative instruments. Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal Group also invests as principal in acquisitions that complement 
Morgan Stanley’s commodity trading activities. Morgan Stanley Capi-
tal Group has substantial strategic long-term storage capacity located 
on all three coasts of the United States, in Northwest Europe and 
Asia.
 This 
is how the company’s latest annual report describes the busi-
ness activities of MS Capital Group: 
268
TransMontaigne Partners’ SEC filings offer a rare glimpse 
into Morgan Stanley’s sprawling network of assets and activi-
ties in the energy sector. Ownership of critical infrastructure 
assets—including terminals, pipelines, and marine vessels—
greatly facilitates Morgan Stanley’s trading of energy and 
 
 
 265. Id. at 12–13. 
 266. TransMontaigne Partners L.P., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 73 
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319229/00010 
4746912005319/a2208753z10-ka.htm#aa3.  
 267. TransMontaigne Partners, Form 10-K, supra note 263, at 18. 
 268. Id. The report describes TransMontaigne’s own business operations as 
follows: 
TransMontaigne Inc. is a terminaling, distribution and marketing 
company that markets refined petroleum products to wholesalers, dis-
tributors and industrial and commercial end users throughout the 
United States, primarily in the Gulf Coast, Northeast, Southeast and 
Midwest regions. TransMontaigne Inc. also owns a 100% interest in 
TransMontaigne Canada Holdings, Inc., a Canadian petroleum mar-
keting and terminaling company. As of December 31, 2011, Trans-
Montaigne Inc. owned three refined product terminals; one dry bulk 
product terminal; three railcar facilities; a hydrant system in Port 
Everglades; and its distribution and marketing business. TransMon-
taigne Inc.'s marketing operations generally consist of the distribu-
tion and marketing of refined products through contract and rack spot 
sales in the physical markets. 
Id.  
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commodities, in both physical and derivatives markets.269 At 
the same time, such a direct and active involvement in the 
business of oil and gas processing, storage, and transportation 
creates significant risks for Morgan Stanley. Global energy 
prices are notoriously volatile and depend on a complex inter-
play of various factors, including geopolitical ones. More im-
portantly, however, these activities expose the firm to potential 
legal liability, financial loss, and reputational damage in the 
event of industrial accidents, oil spills, explosions, terrorist 
acts, or other catastrophic events that cause serious environ-
mental harms.270
 
 269. In July 2011, TransMontaigne Partners entered into an agreement for 
construction and operation of a new crude oil storage facility in Cushing, Ok-
lahoma, the major delivery hub and price settlement point for the benchmark 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude. Id. at 14. MS Capital Group’s access to 
this strategically located facility is likely to give it significant additional ad-
vantage in trading oil futures and OTC derivatives referencing WTI. Id. The 
company’s public filings stated: 
 It is difficult to quantify the extent of this 
risk, especially in the case of potential large-scale environmen-
tal disaster, but it is not difficult to imagine that it may be po-
tentially fatal even for a large company with a formidable bal-
ance sheet. For a financial institution whose main business 
depends greatly on its reputation and market perceptions of the 
quality of its credit, even a remote risk of such an event may be 
too much to live with. Morgan Stanley’s public disclosure of this 
particular risk factor is carefully crafted and perfectly under-
stated:  
We will lease a portion of land in Cushing, OK and construct storage 
tanks and associated infrastructure on that property for the receipt of 
crude oil by truck and pipeline, the blending of crude oil and the stor-
age of 1.0 million barrels of crude oil. We have entered into a long-
term services agreement with Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. for 
the use of the facility. 
Id. 
 270. According to Morgan Stanley’s own description of the risk factors spe-
cific to its physical commodities business in its annual report: 
As a result of these activities, we are subject to extensive and evolving 
energy, commodities, environmental, health and safety and other 
governmental laws and regulations. In addition, liability may be in-
curred without regard to fault under certain environmental laws and 
regulations for the remediation of contaminated areas. Further, 
through these activities we are exposed to regulatory, physical and 
certain indirect risks associated with climate change. Our commodi-
ties business also exposes us to the risk of unforeseen and cata-
strophic events, including natural disasters, leaks, spills, explosions, 
release of toxic substances, fires, accidents on land and at sea, wars, 
and terrorist attacks that could result in personal injuries, loss of life, 
property damage, and suspension of operations. 
Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at 27. 
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  Although we have attempted to mitigate our pollution and other 
environmental risks by, among other measures, adopting appropriate 
policies and procedures for power plant operations, monitoring the 
quality of petroleum storage facilities and transport vessels and im-
plementing emergency response programs, these actions may not 
prove adequate to address every contingency. In addition, insurance 
covering some of these risks may not be available, and the proceeds, if 
any, from insurance recovery may not be adequate to cover liabilities 
with respect to particular incidents. As a result, our financial condi-
tion, results of operations and cash flows may be adversely affected by 
these events.271
The business must be worth the risk.  
 
2. Goldman Sachs: Metals, Warehouses, and Other Things 
It is particularly difficult to develop a sufficiently full pic-
ture of the true nature and extent of Goldman’s involvement in 
the production, processing, transportation, and marketing of 
physical commodities.272 Wall Street’s biggest commodities 
dealer (by revenues), Goldman is “credited with attracting the 
investors to the asset class with the creation of the Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index in 1991.”273
 
 271. Id. 
 According to industry es-
timates, the firm’s commodities business—including deriva-
tives and physical trading—generated annual revenues of $3–4 
 272. Unlike Morgan Stanley, Goldman does not appear to have publicly-
traded subsidiaries engaged in physical commodities business, which elimi-
nates the most lucrative source of reliable public information. In its SEC fil-
ings, Goldman provides only a brief description of commodities activities con-
ducted by the firm’s Institutional Client Services segment. See Goldman Sachs 
Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 3. Intriguingly, however, Goldman also 
reports proprietary, long-term investments in physical commodities assets in 
another business segment, Investing and Lending:  
  Our other investments primarily include our consolidated invest-
ment entities, which are entities we hold for investment purposes 
strictly for capital appreciation. These entities have a defined exit 
strategy and are engaged in activities that are not closely related to 
our principal businesses. We also invest directly in distressed assets, 
currencies, commodities and other assets, including power generation 
facilities. 
Id. at 5. It appears that this business segment includes private equity invest-
ments held by Goldman under the merchant banking authority. It is not clear 
whether the commodities and power generation facilities mentioned in the last 
sentence are held as the same kind of passive private equity investments. It 
does not appear that the value of these commodity assets is included in the 
reported market value of commodities in the firm’s trading inventory.  
 273. Jack Farchy, Goldman and Clive Capital to Launch Commodities In-
dex, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/acedcabe 
-9514-11e0-a648-00144feab49a.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk. 
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billion between 2006 and 2008.274
Goldman’s commodities trading business goes back to at 
least 1981, when the firm bought its principal commodities 
trading subsidiary, J. Aron & Co., which originally specialized 
mostly in trading futures and options on precious metals and 
coffee.
  
275 In the 1980s–90s, Goldman focused primarily on cli-
ent-driven financial transactions in commodities and built a 
dominant position in the energy futures and OTC derivatives 
markets. In the first decade of this century, however, Goldman 
“has also been expanding into physical commodities, with ven-
tures into coal and shipping trading, and a bigger presence in 
physical metals such as aluminum.”276
For example, in early 2005, the press reported that Gold-
man had “recently bought 30 electricity-generating plants.”
  
277 
At least in part, this may have been a reference to Goldman’s 
2003 acquisition of Cogentrix Energy LLC, a major power pro-
ducer based in Charlotte, North Carolina.278 At the time, 
Cogentrix owned and operated 26 coal- and natural gas-fired 
power plants.279
During the same period, Goldman reportedly made signifi-
cant acquisitions in the oil and gas sector, including a signifi-
cant stake in Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI), a major oil transpor-
tation and terminaling company that was recently reported to 
control approximately 37,000 miles of pipelines and 180 termi-
nals handling crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum 
  
 
 274. Blas, Commodities Trading Loses, supra note 242. 
 275. J. Aron & Co. Reduces Staff, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1983, http://www 
.nytimes.com/1983/08/19/business/j-aron-co-reduces-staff.html. Both Gold-
man’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein and President Gary Cohn started their careers at 
J. Aron & Co. 
 276. Blas, Commodities Trading Loses, supra note 242. 
 277. Davis, supra note 250. 
 278. Goldman to Sell Power Plant Unit to Carlyle, REUTERS, Sept. 7, 2012, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/cogentrixenergy-carlyle 
-idUSL4E8K73S320120907.  
 279. Ryan Dezember, Carlyle to Acquire Cogentrix from Goldman, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044381940 
4577636172770944192.html. According to media, “Goldman sold off most of 
those plants—and built and sold others—during the last decade as Cogentrix 
transformed into more of a developer of power plants.” Id. In September 2012, 
Goldman reportedly agreed to sell Cogentrix to a private equity firm, Carlyle 
Group L.P., on undisclosed terms. Id.; see also Ben Protess, Carlyle Buys Pow-
er Plants from Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/carlyle-buys-power-plants-from-goldman/? 
pagewanted=print.  
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products.280 According to KMI’s SEC filings, at the end of 2011, 
Goldman owned 19.1% of the company’s common stock.281 In 
addition, the report listed each of the two managing directors of 
Goldman who also served on KMI’s board of directors as hold-
ers of 19.1% of the company’s common stock.282 It appears that 
Goldman has similarly structured private equity investments 
in other energy companies, including Cobalt International En-
ergy Inc. (CIE), a Houston-based deep-water oil exploration and 
production company.283
Even after becoming an FHC subject to the activities re-
strictions of the BHCA and the consolidated supervision by the 
Board, Goldman continued to acquire significant hard assets in 
the commodities sector. For instance, in May 2012, the Finan-
cial Times reported that Goldman made a $407 million deal 
with Brazil’s Vale, to acquire full ownership of Vale’s Colombi-
an coal assets, including the El Hatillo coal mine, Cerro Largo 
coal deposit, and a coal port facility on Colombia’s Atlantic 
 
 
 280. Kinder Morgan, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
In investing in KMI, Goldman was joined by two private equity partners, The 
Carlyle Group (Carlyle) and Riverstone Holdings LLC (Riverstone). Press Re-
lease, The Carlyle Grp., Management Grp. and Inv. Partners Propose to Take 
Kinder Morgan, Inc. “Private” at $100 Per Share (May 28, 2006), available at 
https://carlyle.com/news-room/news-release-archive/management-group-and 
-investment-partners-propose-take-kinder-morgan-inc-pr. 
 281. Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 121–22. Goldman 
held this aggregate equity stake through several controlled funds, which 
means that only a part of this investment was made with the firm’s own capi-
tal, alongside its clients’ money. Id. at 122. 
 282. Id. at 122. It is difficult to ascertain whether and to what extent this 
ownership structure and board membership gave Goldman effective control 
over KMI’s management and operations. Nevertheless, it is a plausible view of 
the arrangement. It is particularly noteworthy that one of these two individu-
als on KMI’s board of directors, Henry Cornell, was the Chief Operating Of-
ficer of Goldman’s Merchant Banking division, while the other, Kenneth 
Pontarelli, was a managing director in the same division. Id. at 103–04. Thus, 
it appears that, for regulatory purposes, Goldman treated its investment in 
KMI as a merchant banking investment permissible to FHCs under the 
BHCA. In the context of Goldman’s overall commodities trading business, 
however, one may legitimately question whether Goldman’s stake in KMI was 
truly a passive, purely financial investment made solely for the purpose of re-
selling it at a profit. 
 283. Goldman holds a common equity stake in CIE through several con-
trolled funds, and two of its managing directors in the merchant banking divi-
sion serve on CIE’s board. Cobalt Int’l Energy Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A), at 10–17 (Mar. 22, 2012). The firm originally invested in CIE in partner-
ship with Carlyle and Riverstone. Cobalt Int’l Energy Inc., Annual Report 
(Form 10-K), at 108 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
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coast.284 In addition, the deal included an 8.43% equity stake in 
the railway connecting the coal mines to the port.285 In addition 
to increasing Goldman’s coal mining capacity, the deal was 
meant to improve access to the port and railway for its existing 
mines.286
Goldman owns and operates its coal mining assets in Co-
lombia through a local subsidiary, Colombian Natural Re-
sources.
  
287 The firm holds its interest in Colombian Natural Re-
sources indirectly, through another wholly-owned subsidiary, 
GS Power Holdings LLC.288 GS Power Holdings also holds an-
other prized asset in Goldman’s commodities empire: Metro In-
ternational Trade Services LLC (Metro).289
Metro is a metals warehousing company that owns and op-
erates nineteen warehouses in the Detroit metropolitan area, 
as well as warehousing facilities in Europe and Asia.
  
290 By ac-
quiring Metro in February 2010, Goldman gained control of one 
of the largest metals warehouses in the global network of stor-
age facilities approved by the LME.291 This acquisition strategi-
cally positioned the firm in the middle of the global metals 
trading chain. Storing large quantities of metal generates lu-
crative rental income for warehousing companies like Metro. 
The warehousing business is particularly profitable during 
economic downturns when slackening demand forces producers 
to hold more of their commodity inventories in storage.292 Not 
surprisingly, Goldman was not the only commodity trader that 
rushed to acquire large LME-approved warehouses in the wake 
of the global financial crisis.293
 
 284. Joe Leahy, Goldman in Deal to Buy Vale’s Coal Assets, FIN. TIMES, 
May 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c23288d0-a8e4-11e1-be59-00144 
feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk. 
 The recent entry of financial in-
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at exh. 21.1.  
 289. Id.  
 290. Walsh, supra note 2.  
 291. Trefis Team, Metal Warehousing Pays Off for Goldman Sachs, 
FORBES, July 8, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/07/ 
08/metal-warehousing-pays-off-for-goldman-sachs/print. 
 292. Javier Blas, Goldman and JPMorgan Enter Metal Warehousing, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5025f82a-262e-11df-aff3 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.  
 293. Glencore bought metals warehousing assets of Italy-based Pacorini 
Group, while JPMC acquired the UK-based Henry Bath as part of its purchase 
of RBS Sempra’s commodities assets. Tatyana Shumski & Andrea Hotter, 
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stitutions effectively turned this traditionally low-profile indus-
try run by dispersed independent operators into yet “another 
arm of Wall Street.”294
This transformation has caused serious turbulence in the 
global market for aluminum, the second most widely-used met-
al in the world after steel.
 
295 Aluminum producers store their 
metal in LME-approved warehouses and then sell their metal 
to industrial users. The buyers claim their purchased quanti-
ties of aluminum from the warehouse, which must deliver it to 
the specific buyer.296 Ownership of the key LME warehouses by 
large commodity traders with integrated financial and physical 
metals operations allows them to control the supply of alumi-
num to commercial users and, as a result, to control prices.297 
This led other market participants to worry about unfair ad-
vantages for such firms, as they now can use their knowledge of 
how much metal is stored, as well as their ability to control de-
livery of physical metal to consumers, to determine their own 
trading strategies.298
 
Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576389680225394642 
.html. 
  
 294. Id. 
 295. Jack Farchy, Banks Force Aluminium Market Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3b3e02e-fcf3-11e1-a4f2-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk.  
  The arrival of investment banks in the aluminium market has 
triggered a shake-up in the $100bn industry that is forcing producers 
from Alcoa to Rusal and consumers such as BMW and Coca-Cola to 
change the way they do business. The increasingly dominant role of 
banks including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank—as 
well as traders such as Glencore—has prompted a surge to record lev-
els in the premium consumers pay for metal over the benchmark price 
set at the London Metal Exchange. 
Id. 
 296. See Shumsky & Hotter, supra note 293. The LME rules set the mini-
mum delivery rates for its warehouses. If the demand for delivery of alumi-
num out of a particular warehouse significantly exceeds the rate at which the 
warehousing company actually releases it, the resulting bottleneck prevents 
the industrial users of aluminum from getting their purchased metal. Id. 
 297. Financial institutions like Goldman Sachs can also use their ware-
houses to store vast quantities of physical metals in so-called “financing” 
deals. This strategy allows financial institutions to secure a guaranteed re-
turn. Removing a large portion of physical metal from the market, however, 
creates artificial shortages of aluminum for commercial purchase and inflates 
its market price. See Farchy, supra note 295. To take full advantage of these 
opportunities, financial institutions that own large warehouses often offer 
monetary incentives to producers who store their metal in their facilities. Id. 
 298. Andrea Hotter, LME Doubles Minimum Metal Deliveries in Detroit, 
WALL ST. J., July 15, 2011, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lme-doubles 
  
2013] MERCHANTS OF WALL STREET 323 
 
Goldman and its subsidiary Metro became the key figures 
in a recent ugly battle over global aluminum prices. In mid-
2011, Metro reportedly stored nearly a half of the global inven-
tories of the industrial aluminum.299 Months-long delivery de-
lays at the firm’s storage facilities in Detroit caused much dis-
content among big commercial users of aluminum, such as the 
soft-drink giant Coca-Cola and the aluminum sheet-maker 
Novelis.300 In mid-2011, Coca-Cola filed a complaint with the 
LME alleging that Goldman intentionally limited the releases 
of aluminum from its Metro-operated warehouses in order to 
inflate the price of aluminum.301 In addition to potentially ena-
bling Goldman to sell its own aluminum at artificially inflated 
prices, holding aluminum in the warehouse generates addition-
al fees for Metro, as the buyers have to pay for each day their 
purchased metal stays in the warehouse.302
In response to these complaints, the LME doubled the min-
imum delivery rates for large warehouses, including Metro.
  
303 
Nevertheless, warehousing bottlenecks and record-high alumi-
num premiums continued to wreak havoc in global aluminum 
markets throughout 2012304 and 2013.305
 
-minimum-metal-deliveries-in-detroit-2011-07-15/print?guid=C5A329C8 
-0E58-4AA7-AA2C-72ADCFA5AE65.  
 By mid-2013, the re-
 299. See Trefis Team, supra note 291; see also Pratima Desai et al., Gold-
man’s New Money Machine: Warehouses, REUTERS, July 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE76R3YZ20110729 (stating 
that, in the first six months of 2011, “Metro warehouses in Detroit took in 
364,175 tonnes of aluminum and delivered out 171,350 tonnes [which] repre-
sented 42 percent of inventory arrivals globally and 26 percent of the metal 
delivered out”). 
 300. See Shumsky & Hotter, supra note 293. 
 301. Coca-Cola alleged that it had to wait for seven months for Metro to 
release its aluminum. See Walsh, supra note 290. 
 302. See Desai et al., supra note 299; Trefis Team, supra note 291. 
  Goldman charges 42 cents to store a metric ton of aluminum in its 
facilities for a day, which translates into $150 in annual revenues for 
every metric ton it stores. With millions of tons in storage, the indus-
try is expected to rake in $1 billion in storage revenues each year. 
Goldman Sachs which is estimated to hold 900,000 tons in its facili-
ties can make $138 million in revenues from its storage business 
alone.  
Trefis Team, supra note 291.  
 303. See Hotter, supra note 298 (explaining that under the new LME rule, 
beginning in April 2012, Metro had to deliver out at least 3,000 metric tons of 
aluminum daily).  
 304. See Jack Farchy, Aluminium Market’s Premium Problem, FIN. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c04c50f6-fdc5-11e1-8fc3-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk (“Japanese premiums for the fourth quarter are 
settling at about $255 a tonne—more than double the level of six months 
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ported waiting time for aluminum in Detroit was longer than 
460 days.306 In July 2013, the LME’s new leadership proposed 
another change to its rules to require warehouses experiencing 
logjams to deliver out more metal than they take in.307 The new 
rule, however, is expected to become effective only starting in 
April 2014, which means continuing supply-chain disruptions 
and inflated prices for nearly another year.308 Not surprisingly, 
Goldman remains the key target of wholesale aluminum con-
sumers’ anger.309
B. THE RISE OF JPMC: HOW NOT TO WASTE A CRISIS 
  
Unlike Morgan Stanley and Goldman, JPMC has always 
been a regulated BHC subject to activity restrictions. In 2005, 
JPMC received the Board’s approval to trade physical commod-
ities as an activity “complementary” to its commodity deriva-
tives business.310 Under the terms of the Board’s approval, 
however, JPMC did not have legal authority to “own, operate, 
or invest in [any physical assets or] facilities for the extraction, 
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities.”311 The-
se conditions reflected the Board’s judgment with respect to the 
outer boundaries of FHC-permissible involvement in these 
purely commercial activities.312
 
ago—and producers and traders are talking about premiums of $320–$330 a 
tonne for European metal for the first quarter of next year.”). 
 In effect, the Board’s decisions 
permit FHCs like JPMC to own hard assets in the physical 
commodities marketing chain, only as passive merchant bank-
 305. Jack Farchy, HKEx’s LME Warehousing Conundrum, FIN. TIMES, 
June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3fad0594-d10f-11e2-a3ea-00144 
feab7de.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk. 
 306. Laura Clarke & Matt Day, New Stab at Metals Gridlock, WALL ST. J., 
July 2, 2013, at C4.  
 307. Id.; see also Jack Farchy, LME Takes Aim at Warehousing Queues, 
FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5988476c-e235-11e2 
-a7fa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dIS9LaYk. 
 308. Clarke & Day, supra note 306, at C1. 
 309. Farchy, Aluminium Market’s, supra note 304. Aluminum end-users’ 
complaints could potentially translate into legal action against the firm on an-
titrust grounds. In the fall of 2012, newspapers quoted Bob Bernstein, a New 
York lawyer representing commodities consumers, as saying that the domi-
nant position of Goldman’s warehousing subsidiary in LME’s Detroit hub 
“naturally raises concerns about competition and the monopoly rents that are 
being charged.” Id. This Article does not purport to assess the merits of any 
such claim. 
 310. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 311. See id. 
 312. See supra Part II. 
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ing investments. 
The financial crisis became the key turning point for 
JPMC, which emerged from it significantly larger and even 
more systemically important than it had been before the crisis. 
In 2008, JPMC bought, at a steep discount, the key assets of 
Bear Stearns, an independent investment bank on the verge of 
failure.313 As part of the deal, JPMC acquired commodity trad-
ing assets and operations, including a significant network of 
electric power generating facilities owned by Arroyo Energy In-
vestors L.P. (Arroyo), a commodities subsidiary of Bear 
Stearns.314
After acquiring Bear’s energy assets, JPMC’s CEO Jamie 
Dimon and the head of commodities operations Blythe Masters 
began aggressively expanding the firm’s physical commodities 
business.
  
315 In 2008, the firm started trading physical oil and 
looking at “more ways to boost its presence in energy mar-
kets.”316 In addition to hiring more people in its commodities 
and energy trading and investment team, JPMC started draw-
ing plans for strategically expanding its metals and energy op-
erations in Asia.317
JPMC’s once-in-a-lifetime chance to become a major player 
in commodities came in late 2009, when the European Com-
mission ordered nationalized RBS to divest its riskier assets,
 
318
 
 313. Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens 
Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.  
 
 314. See id.; Linette Lopez, How the Financial Crisis Helped Turn Big 
Banks into Global Commodities Kings, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/banks-got-big-in-commodities-in-financial 
-crisis-2013-8. Arroyo reportedly bought seventeen power projects, with a total 
of 1,217 gross MW, from Delta Power Company LLC in January 2007. Arroyo 
Energy Completes Buy of Delta Power Co., REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2007, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/25/utilities-arroyo-bearstearns-idUS 
N2519863620070125. In September 2010, Arroyo acquired a 100% stake in 
Triton combined cycle facility in Michigan, operated by KMI. Arroyo Energy to 
Acquire 100% Stake in Triton Combined Cycle Facility from CIT Group, 
RESEARCHVIEWS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.researchviews.com/energy/power/ 
DealReport.aspx?sector=Power&DealID=145576. 
 315. See David Sheppard, JPMorgan’s Chief Oil Analyst Leaves Firm, 
REUTERS, May 31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/ 
31/jpmorgan-eagles-departs-idUSL1E8GVJW020120531.  
 316. Sambit Mohanty, JPMorgan to Start Physical Oil Trade, Eyes $200 
Oil, REUTERS, May 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/ 
05/14/us-jpmorgan-commodities-idUSSP14850120080514.  
 317. See id. 
 318. See Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Comm’n Approves 
Impaired Asset Relief Measure and Restructuring Plan of Royal Bank of Scot-
land (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13 
  
326 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:265 
 
including its fifty-one percent stake in RBS Sempra, a large 
U.S. commodities and energy trading company.319 In July 2010, 
JPMC bought RBS Sempra’s global oil, global metals, and Eu-
ropean power and gas businesses.320 In addition to bringing in 
approximately $1.7 billion of net assets, the $1.6 billion acqui-
sition nearly doubled the number of clients JPMC’s commodi-
ties business could serve and enabled the firm “to offer clients 
more products in more regions of the world.”321
In November 2010, JPMC also bought RBS Sempra’s North 
American power and gas business, which added further 
strength to the operations the firm inherited from Bear 
Stearns.
  
322 This purchase propelled JPMC into the top tier of 
natural gas and power marketers in North America.323 Several 
months after closing the deal, the firm boasted having control 
of “a diverse network of physical assets, including 70 billion cu-
bic feet per day of storage capacity—an  increase of almost 
100% since the purchase—and almost double the transport ca-
pacity it had previously.”324
By late 2010, JPMC had emerged as a formidable contend-
er for the title of dominant Wall Street energy and commodities 
  
 
-788_en.htm. 
 319. RBS Sempra was a joint venture between RBS and Sempra Energy. 
See Aldrick, supra note 197. RBS paid $1.35 billion for its 51% stake in the 
company. See Sharlene Goff & Javier Blas, Suitors Line Up for RBS’s Sempra 
Stake, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d587886-e509 
-11de-9a25-00144feab49a.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N.  
 320. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 184 (Feb. 
28, 2012), available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/secfiling 
.cfm?filingID=950123-11-19773 [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form 
10-K]. 
 321. Id.; see Press Release, J.P. Morgan, J.P. Morgan Completes Commodi-
ties Acquisition from RBS Sempra (July 1, 2010), available at http://www 
.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_ 
Detail_Page_Template&cid=1277505237241. 
 322. See Energy Risk Names J.P. Morgan “Oil & Products House of the 
Year,” J.P.MORGAN (July 1, 2011), http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs? 
pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_Detail_Page_Template& 
cid=1309472621690&c=JPM_Content_C. Sempra’s trading portfolio included 
“physical and financial gas and power transactions and access to pipelines and 
gas storage facilities.” Gregory Meyer, JPMorgan Buys RBS Sempra Commod-
ities’ Trading Book, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
ed83952e-d24e-11df-8fbe-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N. Nearly 750 
counterparties to these trades included “gas producers, power plants, utilities 
and governments.” Id.  
 323. See id. (“In the second quarter [of 2010], RBS Sempra ranked the fifth-
largest North American gas marketer by volume, after BP, Royal Dutch Shell, 
Conoco-Phillips and Macquarie, according to Platts. JPMorgan was 12th.”). 
 324. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 322.  
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trading house, previously shared by Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman.325 The firm conducts most of its physical energy and 
commodity activities through a wholly-owned subsidiary, J.P. 
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation.326
We are active in both the physical and financial markets worldwide 
for crude oil and oil-refined products, coal, power and gas, and have 
extensive capabilities in the voluntary and mandatory emissions 
markets.  
 JPMC’s official web-
site describes the firm as one of the leading energy market-
makers in the world: 
. . . Our geographically diverse physical asset portfolio includes more 
than 40 North American locations. In addition, we are one of the larg-
est natural gas traders in the U.K. and European markets, with daily 
volumes of approximately 100 million therms.327
In addition to oil, gas, and electric power assets, JPMC’s crisis-
driven acquisitions allowed the firm to become a significant 
force in global markets for metals. In late 2011, JPMC bought a 
stake in LME from the bankrupt futures firm, MF Global, and 
became the exchange’s largest shareholder.
 
328 As part of its 
Sempra deal, JPMC acquired control of Henry Bath, a UK-
based metals warehousing company that owns and operates 
one of the largest LME-approved global metal storage net-
works.329
  Today, Henry Bath, a subsidiary of JP Morgan, engages in the 
storage and shipping of exchange traded metals and soft commodities. 
It offers warehousing, shipping transportation and customs clearance 
services. The company stores and issues exchange traded warrants 
for commodities, including aluminium, copper zinc, lead, nickel, tin, 
 According to the company’s own description:  
 
 325. See CNBC, supra note 229. 
 326. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K, supra note 320, at 329–30; J.P. 
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation: Private Company Information—
Businessweek, BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/ 
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=28404895 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 327. Energy Commodities Trading, J.P.MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan 
.com/pages/jpmorgan/investbk/solutions/commodities/energy (last visited Oct. 
9, 2013).  
 328. Mark Scott & Michael J. de la Merced, JPMorgan Said to Buy MF 
Global Stake in London Metal Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/jpmorgan-said-to-buy-mf-global-stake-in 
-london-metal-exchange/?_r=1.  
 329. See Mike Jackson, Henry Bath & Son: A Company and Family Histo-
ry, HENRY BATH, http://www.henrybath.com/assets/_files/documents/jun_11/ 
HENRYBATH__1308588481_Complete_Henry_Bath_History.pdf (last updat-
ed June, 2011) (discussing how, because Henry Bath has extended its storage 
space in America, it is “recognized as one of the dominant warehouses for the 
London Metal Exchange”); Desai et al., supra note 299. Curiously, Henry Bath 
was at one time owned by Enron. Id. 
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steel billets, cocoa, coffee and plastics.
330
Recent media reports indicate that JPMC has been build-
ing up its metals warehousing business in order to strengthen 
the competitive position of Henry Bath vis-à-vis Glencore’s 
Pacorini and Goldman’s Metro.
 
331 The reports of JPMC moving 
large amounts of metal from other warehouses into its own 
suggest that the firm may be rebuilding its stocks and consoli-
dating its warehousing business in key European locations.332 
This is likely to exacerbate the conflict within the aluminum 
industry over the unprecedented degree of power that the larg-
est warehousing companies like Henry Bath and Metro exercise 
over global aluminum prices.333
JPMC may be in a particularly sensitive situation because 
of its controversial move to market the first exchange-traded 
fund (ETF) backed by physical copper.
  
334 JPMC has been re-
portedly buying up copper since 2010, in anticipation of its ETF 
launch.335 The firm’s ability to remove from the market and 
store in its own warehouses vast quantities of this critically 
important metal potentially lends more credibility to the fears 
of market cornering expressed by the opponents of JPMC’s ETF 
plan.336
 
 330. Jackson, supra note 
 It makes it difficult for JPMC to maintain that trading 
copper-backed ETF shares is not going to result in artificial in-
329. 
 331. See, e.g., Josephine Mason & Susan Thomas, Exclusive: JP Morgan 
Adds Muscle to Metals Warehousing Money, REUTERS, Feb. 1, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-metals-jpmorgan-idUSTRE81 
019J20120201.  
 332. See id.  
 333. See id.; see also supra notes 290–309 and accompanying text. 
 334. See Jack Farchy, Copper ETF Plan Would “Wreak Havoc,” FIN. TIMES, 
May 23, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7d32d4c-a4fb-11e1-b421-00144 
feabdc0.html#axzz2d2ZhI3N. The SEC approved JPMC’s plan to market its 
copper-backed ETF in December 2012. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-68440, 2012 WL 656113 (Dec. 14, 2012), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2012/34-68440.pdf.  
 335. See Louise Armitstead & Rowena Mason, JP Morgan Revealed as 
Mystery Trader That Bought £1bn-Worth of Copper on LME, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 
4, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/8180304/JP 
-Morgan-revealed-as-mystery-trader-that-bought-1bn-worth-of-copper-on-LME 
.html. In April 2012, JPMC reportedly held thirty to forty percent of total cop-
per positions on the LME. CESCO WEEK: Glencore, JP Morgan Hold Domi-
nant Copper Position as Back Flares—Sources, METALBULLETIN (Apr. 18, 
2012, 1:34 PM), http://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3013578/CESCO 
-WEEK-Glencore-JP-Morgan-hold-dominant-copper-positions-as-back-flares 
-sources.html.  
 336. See Armitstead & Mason, supra note 335; see also Mason & Thomas, 
supra note 331. 
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flation of global copper prices.337
JPMC’s newly acquired physical commodity and energy as-
sets and operations, however, raise a more fundamental legal 
question as to whether the firm has the statutory authority to 
own such assets and to conduct such operations in the first 
place. The Board’s original order authorizing JPMC’s physical 
commodity trading did not allow JPMC to own or operate any 
assets involved in generating, storing, transporting, or pro-
cessing commodities.
 
338 In fact, even energy tolling and energy 
management were outside of the scope of that original authori-
zation.339 As part of its Sempra acquisition, JPMC obtained the 
Board’s approval to continue energy tolling, energy manage-
ment, and long-term wholesale electricity supply activities of 
RBS.340 Under the terms of the order, JPMC’s newly expanded 
activities are subject to the requirements and conditions con-
tained in the original RBS Order.341
It appears that JPMC generally conducts its physical 
commodity operations subject to Board-imposed limitations. 
According to the firm’s SEC filings, it entered into operating 
leases for “premises and equipment” used partially for “energy-
related tolling service agreements.”
  
342 JPMC also enters into 
various forms of “supply and off-take” contracts with producers 
and processors of commodities, such as oil refineries.343 These 
contracts are functionally similar to energy management ar-
rangements JPMC and other FHCs have with electric power 
plants under the “complementary” authority grants.344
 
 337. See Jack Farchy, JPMorgan Flip Flops on Commodity ETFs, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a782c1c6-f772-11e1-ba54 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2d2Z8hI3N.  
 Thus, in 
April 2012, business media reported that Delta Airlines was 
 338. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.  
 339. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text.  
 340. See Letter from Board to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (June 30, 2010) 
[hereinafter JPMC Board Order]. 
 341. See id.; see also RBS Order, supra note 196. 
 342. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K, supra note 320, at 289. This 
probably reflects the general practice among FHCs engaged in physical com-
modity trading under the Board’s “complementary” orders. See supra Part 
II.B.1. To avoid legally owning or operating any physical assets involved in the 
marketing chain, JPMC probably enters into some form of a sale-and-lease-
back contract, whereby an unaffiliated third party is the legal owner of the 
physical facilities and operates those facilities under a lease agreement with 
JPMC. 
 343. See Meyer, supra note 6. 
 344. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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planning to purchase Conoco’s idle Trainer oil refinery, in order 
to lower its jet fuel costs, and that JPMC agreed to finance the 
entire production process through a supply and off-take agree-
ment.345 Under the arrangement, JPMC would purchase and 
pay for delivery of the crude for the refinery’s operation, sell the 
jet fuel to Delta at a wholesale price, and then sell other refined 
products on the open market.346 In July 2012, JPMC entered in-
to a similar supply and off-take arrangement with the largest 
oil refinery on the East Coast, owned and operated by Sunoco 
and Carlyle.347 These transactions significantly reduce refiner-
ies’ working capital needs and offload the risk on JPMC, which 
has far greater balance-sheet capacity.348
Nevertheless, there are signs that the Board may feel 
somewhat uneasy about at least some of JPMC’s recently ac-
quired physical commodity operations. The 2010 JPMC Board 
Order explicitly required JPMC to either divest or conform to 
the requirements of the BHCA the activities of (1) “owning, in-
vesting in, or operating” commodity storage facilities, and (2) 
making and taking physical delivery of metal concentrates and 
other commodities not previously approved by the Board for 
trading.
 In effect, JPMC con-
tractually replicates owning oil refineries without violating the 
letter of the law. 
349 The Board gave JPMC a time limit of two years after 
the acquisition to comply with these commitments but reserved 
a discretionary right to extend that grace period.350
 
 345. See, e.g., Kate Kelly, The Glue in Delta’s Possible Refinery Deal: JP 
Morgan, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id47017435.  
 In addition, 
 346. See id. 
 347. See Janet McGurty, Carlyle Saves Big Sunoco Refinery with Shale 
Boom, JPMorgan, REUTERS, July 2, 2012, available at http://www.reuters 
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see also Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1. 
 348. See Meyer, supra note 6. According to Blythe Masters, the head of 
JPMC’s global commodities unit, it is this “risk and balance sheet capacity” 
that puts big banks in the unique position to do these supply and off-take 
deals. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Non-bank commodity trad-
ing houses typically use about seventy-five to eighty percent of their credit 
lines, which leaves them little room for taking on new deals, while still main-
taining a comfortable cushion against sudden price rises. Id. 
 349. See JPMC Board Order, supra note 340. Because metal concentrate 
futures were not traded on major organized commodity exchanges, the Board 
excluded metal concentrates from the scope of its original order approving 
RBS’s “complementary” activities. See RBS Order, supra note 196, at C67.  
 350. JPMC Board Order, supra note 340. Under the terms of the original 
RBS Order, RBS committed to discontinue within two years its activities of 
owning or investing in storage facilities for commodities that RBS was not 
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the Board prohibited JPMC from expanding the scope of these 
activities beyond those Sempra conducted immediately prior to 
its acquisition by JPMC.351
In April 2012, JPMC sold its metals-concentrate trading 
unit to Connecticut-based Freepoint.
  
352 The firm’s continuing 
ownership and operation of Henry Bath, however, presents a 
potential problem in this regard. As of this writing, JPMC has 
not yet ceased its lucrative metal warehousing operations, even 
though they may be inconsistent with the terms of the Board’s 
“complementary” orders.353
JPMC’s speedy rise to the top of the Wall Street commodity 
trading circle has created new legal and reputational risks for 
the firm. In the summer of 2012, the FERC launched an inves-
tigation into JPMC’s electric power trading practices.
  
354 The 
agency began its probe in response to complaints from electric 
power grid operators in California and the Midwest in 2011, al-
leging that JPMC’s power traders had intentionally bid up 
wholesale electricity prices by more than $73 million.355 Artifi-
cial inflation of wholesale prices benefits power generators 
(which is functionally JPMC’s role) but translates into higher 
power prices for households and other end-users.356
 
permitted to own or hold under the BHCA, as well as not to make or take 
physical delivery of metal concentrates. See RBS Order, supra note 
 Moreover, 
196, at 
C67. Here, the Board restarted the clock for JPMC, giving it at least until mid-
2012 to comply with these requirements. 
 351. See JPMC Board Order, supra note 340. 
 352. Josephine Mason, Freepoint Agrees to Buy JPM’s Metal Concentrates 
Business, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/04/25/freepoint-jpm-concentrates-idUSL2E8FP0T320120425; Josephine 
Mason, JPMorgan Poised to Sell U.S. Metal Concentrate Unit, REUTERS, Apr. 
20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-jpmorgan 
-concentrates-idUSBRE83J1KS20120420. The sold unit excluded JPMC’s 
physical copper and aluminum trading desks in London and Singapore. Jose-
phine Mason, JPMorgan Poised to Sell U.S. Metal Concentrate Unit, REUTERS, 
Apr. 20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us 
-jpmorgan-concentrates-idUSBRE83J1KS20120420. 
 353. It is, of course, possible that the Board quietly exercised its discretion 
to extend the two-year grace period, as provided in the JPMC Board Order, 
supra note 340.  
 354. See Scott DiSavino & David Sheppard, JPMorgan Probed over Possible 
Power Market Manipulation, REUTERS, July 3, 2012, available at http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-utilities-jpmorgan-ferc-idUSBRE8620LK20 
120703.  
 355. Id.  
 356. See id. This scenario brings back memories of the infamous California 
power market manipulation scandal and the Enron failure in 2001. See gener-
ally Tapes: Enron Plotted to Shut Down Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3, 2005, 
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as recent FERC enforcement actions demonstrate, the focus of 
today’s fraud prevention in power markets is on more subtle 
trading strategies that seek to manipulate the price of physical 
power in order to increase the value of the manipulator’s finan-
cial bets.357 JPMC’s role as the leading global energy derivatives 
dealer358 potentially exacerbates concern over the firm’s traders 
engaging in this type of market manipulation.359
Even in the absence of an admission of wrongdoing on the 
part of JPMC, the very fact of FERC’s investigation and sanc-
tions
  
360 raises uncomfortable questions about the potential im-
pact of the firm’s newly-expanded energy operations on its 
overall institutional culture and reputation. These concerns be-
come particularly acute in the context of the infamous “London 
Whale” scandal that exposed deep problems with JPMC’s risk 
management practices.361 Both cases demonstrate the inherent 
difficulty of drawing regulatory distinctions among various 
transactions based on the firm’s intentions and proclaimed 
business purposes. Just as a legitimate hedge can become a lu-
crative bet under favorable market conditions, so can financing-
and-risk-management arrangements with oil refineries and 
power generators become a profitable proprietary business of 
energy merchanting.362
 
11:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/enron.tapes (discussing the En-
ron California power scandal). 
 How the law should deal with this com-
plex reality is one of the key questions in today’s financial ser-
 357. See, e.g., DiSavino & Sheppard, supra note 354.  
 358. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
 359. On September 20, 2012, FERC initiated an official proceeding accus-
ing J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation, JPMC’s commodity trading 
arm, of intentionally providing misleading information to the regulator. News 
Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Initiates Proceeding into Ac-
tions by JP Morgan (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/ 
2012/2012-3/09-20-12-E-24.asp. 
 360. JPMC ultimately settled this matter by agreeing to pay the FERC 
$410 million in civil penalties, including $125 million in disgorgement of un-
just profits, without admitting any wrongdoing. News Release, Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, FERC, JP Morgan Unit Agree to $410 Million in Penal-
ties, Disgorgement to Ratepayers (July 20, 2013), available at http://www.ferc 
.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.Ui1mRRZEO5d; see also 
Brian Wingfield & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S. 
FERC Settlement, BLOOMBERGLAW (July 30, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://about 
.bloomberglaw.com/legal-news/jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc 
-settlement. 
 361. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Suzanne Craig, JPMorgan 
Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion. 
 362. See supra notes 314–27 and accompanying text. 
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vices regulation reform.  
IV.  WHAT SAY WE? LEGAL, POLICY, AND THEORETICAL 
IMPLICATIONS   
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the recent fi-
nancial crisis has fundamentally altered the nature and scope 
of large U.S. banking organizations’ involvement in physical 
commodity and energy markets. This Part addresses legal, pol-
icy, and theoretical implications of this phenomenon.  
This Part argues, first, that the BHCA does not provide a 
clear and effective legal framework for making a fundamental 
policy decision on the socially efficient degree of mixing bank-
ing and commercial commodities activities. It argues, further, 
that there are important policy reasons why such mixing, at 
least to the degree to which it is done today, may be socially 
undesirable and inefficient. In addition to the traditional con-
cerns underlying the original doctrine of separation of banking 
and commerce, it may be especially critical to keep banks out of 
the strategically important and complex markets for energy 
and physical commodities for reasons of systemic risk preven-
tion, regulatory efficiency, and the long-term governability of 
financial institutions.  
Finally, this Part argues that taking these policy concerns 
seriously potentially necessitates extending the prohibition on 
physical commodity and energy trading beyond banks and 
BHCs to all SIFIs. In that sense, the recent transformation of 
large U.S. financial institutions into global commodity dealers 
raises not only urgent legal and policy issues but also funda-
mental theoretical questions about the nature, social functions, 
and proper regulatory boundaries of modern financial interme-
diation. This Part concludes by outlining some of these theoret-
ical issues for future research. 
A. POST-CRISIS LEGAL PARADOXES: NEW GAME UNDER OLD 
RULES, OR OLD GAME UNDER NEW RULES? 
Even a cursory overview of publicly available information 
shows that the current commodity operations of Morgan Stan-
ley, Goldman, and JPMC defy carefully drawn pre-crisis regu-
latory boundaries of FHC-permissible physical commodities ac-
tivities—and effectively nullify the principle of separating 
banking from commerce. Broadly, there are two potential ways 
to resolve this tension: either FHCs’ impermissible commercial 
activities must be brought into compliance with the law, or the 
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law should be changed to reflect FHCs’ newly acceptable role as 
global commodity merchants. 
1. The BHCA Solution: Definitely, Maybe 
The BHCA does not provide a definitive framework for 
making this fundamental choice. In fact, the statute is surpris-
ingly vague on this issue.  
The commodity grandfathering provision of section 4(o) of 
the BHCA potentially provides the greatest latitude for Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman, as two FHCs qualifying for this exemp-
tion, to continue owning and operating their extensive commod-
ity assets “and underlying physical properties.”363 Indeed, both 
firms have publicly stated their intent to rely on this exemption 
to keep their physical commodity operations even after becom-
ing subject to the BHCA activity restrictions.364 On its face, sec-
tion 4(o) does not impose any qualitative limits on grandfa-
thered activities: the language of the provision is broad and 
open to expansive interpretation.365 Yet, as discussed above, the 
legislative history of this grandfathering provision, originally 
conceived as a special concession to “woofies”—financial insti-
tutions without access to FDIC-insured retail deposit-taking—
indicates that it was not designed to operate as a completely 
open-ended commodity-business license for banking organiza-
tions.366 It is doubtful that, at the time the GLBA was passed, 
Congress actually envisioned the current extent and depth of 
these firms’ physical commodities operations.367
 
 363. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2012). 
 Ironically, the 
very breadth of the grandfathering exemption in section 4(o) of 
 364. Thus, Morgan Stanley provided this disclosure in its SEC filings: 
  We are engaged in discussions with the Federal Reserve regard-
ing our commodities activities, as the BHC Act provides a grandfather 
exemption for “activities related to the trading, sale or investment in 
commodities and underlying physical properties,” provided that we 
were engaged in “any of such activities as of September 30, 1997 in 
the United States” and provided that certain other conditions that are 
within our reasonable control are satisfied. 
Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K, supra note 135, at 27. Goldman’s SEC filings also 
expressed the firm’s confidence that it qualified for the section 4(o) exemption 
when it stated “we are permitted under the GLB Act to continue to engage in 
certain commodities activities in the United States that may otherwise be im-
permissible for bank holding companies, so long as the assets held pursuant to 
these activities do not equal five percent or more of our consolidated assets.” 
Goldman Sachs Grp., Form 10-K, supra note 134, at 9. 
 365. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.  
 366. See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 367. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text. 
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the BHCA may actually render it less useful to Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman in practice, as the Board may be more reluctant 
to ratify such an open-ended expansion of FHCs’ commercial 
commodities activities.368
An even greater irony is that the commodity grandfather-
ing provision was included in the GLBA as an inducement for 
investment banks to become regulated FHCs.
 
369 Yet, during the 
2008 crisis, no additional incentives were necessary to induce 
every surviving investment bank to seek BHC status.370
In the alternative, Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC 
can seek the Board’s approval of their existing commodities ac-
tivities as complementary to FHC-permissible financial activi-
ties, such as commodity derivatives. As discussed above, the 
BHCA does not define what “complementary” means and leaves 
it largely to the Board’s discretion to determine whether any 
particular activity fits that description.
 In the 
wake of the crisis that changed the face of the industry, there 
seems to be no plausible policy basis for this ambiguous and 
remarkably broad commodity grandfathering provision.  
371 An examination of 
published Board orders shows the regulator’s general reluc-
tance to allow FHCs to incur non-financial risks associated 
with owning and operating oil rigs, coal mines, refineries, stor-
age tanks, pipelines, and tankers.372
 
 368. Curiously, TransMontaigne Partners, an indirect oil transportation 
and terminaling subsidiary of Morgan Stanley, disclosed in its SEC filings 
that in October 2011 Morgan Stanley imposed a temporary moratorium on the 
company’s “significant” asset acquisitions and investments, as a necessary 
measure in light of the uncertain regulatory environment relating, in part, to 
Morgan Stanley’s non-financial investments. See TransMontaigne Partners, 
Form 10-K, supra note 
 As is the case with any 
agency policy, however, the Board’s position may change in re-
sponse to various internal and external factors. Moreover, even 
if the Board insists on its pre-crisis determination that “com-
plementary” commodity trading activities exclude direct owner-
ship and operation of physical assets, the practical impact of 
263, at 34–35. This decision by Morgan Stanley may 
have indicated the firm’s doubts regarding the availability of the grandfather-
ing exemption for its oil and gas operations. According to recent media reports, 
at least some Board officials are increasingly skeptical about Morgan Stanley’s 
ownership of TransMontaigne. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Liam Pleven, Wall 
Street Is Rethinking Commodity-Trading Role, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2012, at 
C1. 
 369. See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text. 
 370. See, e.g., supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 372. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 187. 
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that seemingly bright-line border may be rather limited. FHCs 
can (and do) use various forms of “sale and lease-back” or “sup-
ply and off-take” arrangements to replicate the effects of own-
ing and operating individual key links in the commodity supply 
chain.373
Finally, FHCs can use merchant banking authority to 
keep, and even expand, their current physical commodity as-
sets.
 
374 Merchant banking is a potentially tempting choice be-
cause it can be used without the Board’s pre-approval: the FHC 
can make the determination that it holds certain investments 
under that statutory authority.375 As discussed above, FHC-
permissible merchant banking investments must meet certain 
statutory requirements intended to prevent FHCs from actively 
running the commercial businesses of their portfolio compa-
nies.376 The holding period limitations377 and the prohibition on 
FHCs’ involvement in “routinely managing” portfolio compa-
nies’ businesses378 seem tough in principle but are not neces-
sarily a “deal-breaker.”379 Large FHCs already invest in com-
modity and energy companies under the merchant banking 
authority.380 It is not difficult to structure specific investments 
to meet the formal statutory criteria without giving up real 
control. It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether these in-
vestments are, in fact, truly passive private equity interests ac-
quired purely for the purposes of profitable resale. In practice, 
FHCs can—and most likely do—exercise informal influence on 
portfolio companies’ business decisions, which may be just as 
effective as a formal management role.381
 
 373. See supra Part I.B.2; supra note 
  
342; see also supra notes 343–48 and 
accompanying text. While these arrangements may potentially reduce direct 
risks to individual FHCs’ safety and soundness, their proliferation implicates 
other policy concerns the Board must consider in granting “complementary” 
powers to FHCs: excessive concentration of market power, conflicts of interest, 
and increased systemic risk. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; infra 
Part IV.B. 
 374. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2012). 
 375. See id. 
 376. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 377. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text. Thus, Goldman re-
portedly structured its investment in Metro as a merchant banking invest-
ment. See Sheppard et al., supra note 25. 
 381. Goldman’s investment in KMI provides a good example. On its face, it 
appears to be a bona fide merchant banking investment. Yet, even if Goldman 
itself cannot formally participate in routinely managing KMI’s affairs, its long-
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Moreover, as discussed below, using merchant banking au-
thority to invest in companies engaged in producing, transport-
ing, and marketing physical commodities may become an in-
creasingly attractive option for FHCs in the context of the 
regulatory reform mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank 
Act).382
 
time co-investors and private equity deal partners, Carlyle and Riverstone, are 
free to so participate. See supra notes 
 
280–83 and accompanying text. It is not 
difficult to imagine a situation in which Goldman’s non-FHC partners direct 
KMI’s business in a manner consistent with Goldman’s business goals and 
commodity trading strategy. Informal influence of this sort is difficult to detect 
and prevent. KMI is engaged principally in the same lines of business as Mor-
gan Stanley’s TransMontaigne subsidiaries that play a crucial role in Morgan 
Stanley’s commodity-trading operations. See id.; supra notes 261–65 and ac-
companying text. If Goldman were to similarly use its stake in KMI to secure 
access to KMI’s transportation and storage facilities in order to facilitate 
Goldman Sachs’s commodity trading, its investment in KMI would not proper-
ly qualify for the merchant banking exemption. Yet, Goldman may be follow-
ing the same pattern with respect to any portfolio company. Without more in-
formation, this is merely a plausible hypothesis. It shows, however, the 
importance of subjecting FHCs’ merchant banking investments in commodity 
and energy assets to closer scrutiny for compliance with the spirit, as well as 
the letter, of the law. 
 382. See infra notes 397–99 and accompanying text. 
  It should be noted here that Goldman and Morgan Stanley potentially 
have another option for keeping all of their existing commodities assets and 
activities outside the prohibitions of section 4 of the BHCA. In theory, both of 
these firms can surrender the bank charters of their deposit-taking subsidiar-
ies and re-charter them as industrial banks or other institutions exempt from 
the BHCA definition of a “bank.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2012). As a result of 
this “de-banking,” Goldman and Morgan Stanley would lose their official BHC 
status. Nevertheless, they will remain subject to extensive regulation and su-
pervision by the Board as non-bank SIFIs. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1398–1402 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323) (authorizing the newly created 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate systemically im-
portant non-bank financial companies to be supervised by the Board under 
heightened prudential standards) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; Dodd-Frank 
Act § 117, 124 Stat. at 1403–06 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5324–25) (mandating 
that a systemically important BHC will remain subject to the Board’s supervi-
sion and heightened prudential standards even if it ceases to own or control a 
U.S. bank).  
  Surrendering their subsidiaries’ bank charters, therefore, is not likely 
to make a significant difference in the overall regulatory burden on Goldman 
and Morgan Stanley. Dodd-Frank Act § 115, 124 Stat. at 1406–08 (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5326) (mandating enhanced prudential regulation of non-bank 
SIFIs). Even though, as a technical matter, they will be free to conduct com-
mercial activities without regard to the BHCA’s prohibitions, the Board and 
FSOC will retain broad authority to monitor and regulate their activities in a 
manner very similar to the regulation of BHCs. See id. It is not clear how the 
regulators will exercise this authority in practice. Yet, if the regulators are 
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2. The Discreet Charm of the Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act, the most wide-ranging financial sec-
tor reform law since the Great Depression, mandates a wide 
range of measures aimed at detecting and reducing systemic 
risk.383
Although the Dodd-Frank Act reiterated Congress’s gen-
eral commitment to the principle of separation of banking and 
commerce,
 The practical efficacy of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, 
depends on the final outcomes of the long and complicated im-
plementation process. As of this writing, there is still much un-
certainty as to its ultimate impact on financial intermediaries’ 
business practices.  
384
The potential effect of the Volcker Rule on FHCs’ commodi-
ties trading, both in financial and physical markets, seems to 
be an area of particular concern in this respect. The Volcker 
Rule generally prohibits “banking entities” from proprietary 
trading in financial instruments and from investing in private 
equity and hedge funds.
 the new law does not directly address the issue of 
the proper scope of FHC-permissible non-financial activities. It 
is not clear whether and how the regulatory implementation of 
the Act will ultimately affect large FHCs’ physical commodities 
operations. As Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and JPMC adapt 
their business models to the evolving regulatory regime, their 
individual choices are difficult to predict with any certainty.  
385 There is a great deal of uncertainty 
as to whether the implementation of that rule would force 
FHCs to reduce or even cease their proprietary trading activi-
ties in physical commodities. Although the statutory language 
is vague and lacking in detail, it outlaws only short-term pro-
prietary trading in financial instruments and not physical 
commodities.386
 
genuinely inclined to stop Goldman and Morgan Stanley from growing their 
commodity-trading businesses, they should not encounter much difficulty in 
using their statutory powers over non-bank SIFIs to achieve that goal. Thus, 
as a practical matter, “de-banking” does not seem to be a viable exit option for 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley, especially given the inescapably bad “optics” of 
such a move. 
  
 383. See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.). 
 384. Dodd-Frank Act § 603(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1598–99 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1815).  
 385. Dodd-Frank Act § 619(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 1629 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1851) (defining “banking entities” as all federally-insured deposit-taking in-
stitutions and their affiliates). 
 386. Dodd-Frank Act § 619(h)(4), 124 Stat. at 1630 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1851). The statute defines “proprietary trading” as follows: 
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It is not clear, however, whether commodity forwards, or 
contracts for future delivery of physical commodities, are 
properly classified as cash trades or financial instruments. In 
October 2011, federal bank regulators published a proposed 
rule that treated commodity forwards as financial contracts.387 
The purpose for this inclusion was to prevent large FHCs from 
evading the Volcker Rule by shifting their proprietary trading 
from derivatives to physical markets.388 In response, large 
FHCs began lobbying for an explicit exemption of commodity 
forwards from the scope of the Volcker Rule.389 JPMC and Mor-
gan Stanley submitted comments on the proposed rulemaking, 
arguing that the Volcker Rule prohibitions threatened their 
ability to engage in physical commodity trading.390 Morgan 
Stanley’s comment letter contained a particularly elaborate and 
extensive argument that prohibitions on proprietary trading in 
commodity derivatives would significantly limit the firm’s abil-
ity to conduct physical commodity operations, and that re-
strictions on the firm’s physical commodities activities would 
greatly harm its customers.391 The letter used a jet fuel supply 
agreement with an airline as an example of its “customer-
facing” “market-making” transactions in commodities markets 
that would be rendered impracticable or possibly illegal under 
the agencies’ proposed rules.392
The veracity of these claims must be assessed in the con-
text of Morgan Stanley’s strategic efforts to minimize the scope 
of the Volcker Rule restrictions on its ability to trade and deal 
in financial instruments. As finally implemented, the Volcker 
  
 
  The term ‘proprietary trading’ . . . means engaging as a principal 
for the trading account of the banking entity . . . in any transaction to 
purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any 
derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any 
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other secu-
rity or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking 
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule . . . determine.  
Id. 
 387. 76 Fed. Reg. 68,845 (Nov. 7, 2001).  
 388. See Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Carl Levin). 
 389. See Sheppard & Alper, supra note 1. 
 390. See Letter from Barry L. Zubrow, Exec. Vice President, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., to Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Domestic Fin. et al. (Feb. 13, 
2012), at 28–29; Letter from Simon T.W. Greenshields, Global Co-Head of 
Commodities, Morgan Stanley, to Fed. Reserve Sys. et al. (Feb. 13, 2012), 
[hereinafter MS Commodities Comment].  
 391. MS Commodities Comment, supra note 390. 
 392. Id. at 8. 
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Rule may, in fact, make FHCs’ physical commodity trading op-
erations more burdensome or less lucrative. Thus, in July 2012, 
the media reported that Morgan Stanley was contemplating a 
sale of a minority stake in its commodities unit, allegedly as a 
preemptive move to comply with the Volcker Rule.393 These re-
ports suggested that Morgan Stanley was seeking a non-bank 
partner to take over the parts of the commodity trading busi-
ness potentially affected by the Volcker Rule’s prohibitions on 
proprietary trading.394 According to Morgan Stanley’s former 
treasurer, however, it is likely that Morgan Stanley is simply 
looking to recapitalize its commodities unit with outside equity 
in order to raise its credit rating after Moody’s Investors Ser-
vice (Moody’s) downgraded the firm’s credit in June 2012.395
In this connection, it is important not to underestimate fi-
nancial institutions’ proven ability to engage in successful regu-
latory arbitrage to avoid constraints on their profit-making ac-
tivities. Morgan Stanley’s characterization of its commercial 
fuel logistics business as a “market-making” function, essential-
ly indistinguishable from other forms of client-driven financial 
intermediation, may signal one such sophisticated arbitrage 
strategy.
 
396
 
 393. See, e.g., Christine Harper, Morgan Stanley May Sell Commodities-
Unit Stake to Fund, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2012-07-20/morgan-stanley-may-sell-commodities-unit-stake-to 
-fund.html (reporting Morgan Stanley’s talks with Blackstone Group and Qa-
tar Investment Authority (QIA) as potential purchasers of a minority stake in 
the firm’s commodity business).  
 Large FHCs may also shift more of their physical 
 394. Id.  
 395. Id. In October 2012, there were more reports of Morgan Stanley’s on-
going negotiations with QIA regarding potential sale of a majority stake in the 
firm’s commodities unit. Tracy Alloway & Javier Blas, M Stanley in Talks over 
Commodities Unit, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
0b2ee132-0d76-11e2-bfcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd.  
 396. MS Commodities Comment, supra note 390. Morgan Stanley’s com-
ment letter prompted an MIT Professor John E. Parsons to post this comment 
on his blog: 
[M]organ Stanley’s jet fuel business provides a real service . . . It’s 
just not market making in financial securities. One can imagine that 
Morgan Stanley’s ability to offer jet fuel logistics services on favorable 
terms benefits from the banks expert analysis of volatile petroleum 
product prices, and also on its ability to trade in both the physical and 
financial petroleum and petroleum product markets. But none of that 
transforms the business into market making. There are plenty of non-
banks that provide exactly this kind of logistics services in all kinds of 
commodities. 
John E. Parsons & Antonio S. Mello, Morgan Stanley Says Potahto, BETTING 
THE BUS. (Apr. 23, 2012, 6:13 AM), http://bettingthebusiness.com/2012/04/23/ 
morgan-stanley-says-potahto.  
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commodities assets into their merchant banking divisions. Be-
cause the Volcker Rule targets only short-term trading activi-
ties for the banking entity’s own account, it does not apply to 
long-term merchant banking investments.397 This potentially 
creates a loophole in the new regulatory regime for FHCs wish-
ing to keep their commodities operations.398
Trading, producing, storing, and moving physical commodi-
ties remains a strategically important business for large FHCs 
like Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and JPMC. According to banks’ 
own statements, trading in physical markets is indispensable 
to their commodity derivatives operations.
 It may be particu-
larly difficult to detect and counteract this form of regulatory 
arbitrage, because the key test for a bona fide merchant bank-
ing investment turns ultimately on the FHC’s intent—a notori-
ously elusive factor. 
399 Not only does 
physical trading give their derivatives traders an invaluable in-
formational advantage but it also puts these firms in the center 
of the strategically important and profitable markets for physi-
cal commodities and energy.400
 
 397. Paul Volcker himself admitted that the rule named after him did not 
explicitly target potentially unacceptable proprietary risk-taking by FHCs 
through long-term merchant banking investments. See Tom Braithwaite, 
Volcker Takes Aim at Long-Term Investments, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a03c58c-242a-11e0-a89a-00144feab49a.html# 
axzz2gX8IEQC5.  
 In addition, it offers potential 
 398. At this point, however, it is not clear whether holding commodity as-
sets under the merchant banking authority would shield FHCs from the unde-
sirable effects of the Volcker Rule. One potential problem under the Volcker 
Rule is that it restricts FHCs’ ability to make merchant banking investments 
through private equity funds. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1850a–1851). Since FHCs 
typically make their merchant banking investments through funds, alongside 
client money, this provision of the Volcker Rule may force FHCs to restructure 
their merchant banking investments. Another potentially serious issue is 
whether merchant banking portfolio companies—the FHC-controlled entities 
that would actually conduct physical commodity trading—are themselves sub-
ject to the Volcker Rule as “banking entities.” See Letter from John F.W. Rog-
ers, Chief of Staff, Goldman Sachs, to Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy (Feb. 13, 2012), at 16 (arguing that federal regulators should explicitly 
exclude merchant banking portfolio companies from the definition of “banking 
entity” under the Volcker Rule). 
 399. See Dmitry Zhdannikov, Banks Struggle to Adapt or Survive in Com-
modities, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/11/05/us-banks-commodities-idUSBRE8A40QC20121105. 
 400. Experts predict that global demand for oil, gas, and metals will con-
tinue to increase, in order to accommodate the growing needs of China and 
other developing countries. See Guy Chazan, Renewables Will Widen Investor 
Enthusiasm, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/975ae 
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regulatory arbitrage opportunities for banking organizations 
able to shift their risk-taking from the increasingly heavily 
regulated derivatives into physical trades. It is unlikely, there-
fore, that these institutions will give it all up without a fight.401
B. RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONAL MYTH: SHOULD POLICY 
PERMIT BANKS TO BE COMMODITY MERCHANTS? 
 
The stakes in this fight are high, not only for the financial 
firms but for the general public as well. Whether systemically 
important U.S. banking organizations should be allowed to con-
tinue their present activities in physical commodity and energy 
markets—and thus render the principle of separating banking 
from commerce effectively meaningless—is an important public 
policy decision that requires careful and informed deliberation. 
An examination of FHCs’ role in physical commodity mar-
 
8dc-a4ca-11e1-9a94-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2eEZAEPXd. Re-
cent decisions by Germany and Japan to shut down their nuclear power facili-
ties and move primarily to natural gas-fired power generation will further in-
crease demand for liquefied natural gas, crude oil, and coal. See Jonathan 
Soble & Javier Blas, Japan to Phase Out Nuclear Power, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9961e7c-fe3e-11e1-8228-00144feabdc0 
.html.  
 401. Initial media reports on Morgan Stanley’s sale plans noted the firm’s 
strong desire to retain the majority stake in its lucrative commodities busi-
ness. Harper, supra note 393; Brett Philbin, Morgan Stanley Not Selling 
Commodities Unit, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/morgan-stanley-not-selling-commodities-unit-2012-06-06. Goldman re-
portedly considered a potential spin-off of its commodities unit but decided 
against it. See Lucchetti & Pleven, supra note 368 (quoting the firm’s state-
ment that it “never seriously looked at” such a spin-off). Until mid-2013, 
JPMC also denied having plans to divest its commodities operations. 
Zhdannikov, supra note 399. In mid-2013, the media again reported on Mor-
gan Stanley’s downsizing of commodities-trading personnel, as well as Gold-
man’s informal efforts to “sound out” potential buyers for Metro. Javier Blas, 
Morgan Stanley Cuts Back Commodities Business, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af923c1e-d9b4-11e2-98fa-00144feab7de.html; 
Clarke & Day, supra note 306.  
  As of this writing, however, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent, 
or even whether, any of these reported moves signal these institutions’ re-
trenchment, temporary or permanent, from physical commodities. Strictly 
speaking, divesting ownership of warehousing or pipeline-operating companies 
does not preclude an FHC from trading physical commodities. Generally, indi-
vidual firms’ decisions to grow or shrink their physical commodity operations 
are driven by numerous considerations, including prevailing trends in com-
modity prices, shifts in these firms’ revenues and regulatory compliance costs, 
political pressures, and even personal preferences of their top managers. As a 
matter of principle, however, particular firms’ business decisions do not dimin-
ish the importance of developing a thoughtful and coherent policy basis for 
regulating banking organizations’ physical commodity activities. 
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kets raises fundamentally important issues not only of current 
law but also of future doctrine and policy. Chief among them is 
whether we should reassert the principle of separation of bank-
ing and commerce. As discussed above, the main reasons for 
not mixing banking with general commerce have traditionally 
included the needs to preserve the safety and soundness of the 
federally-insured U.S. banking system, to ensure a fair and ef-
ficient flow of credit to productive economic enterprise, and to 
prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic pow-
er. Are these stated policy reasons behind the legal principle 
still compelling today? What do the physical commodities activ-
ities of large U.S. FHCs reveal about the ongoing relevance and 
validity of these policy objectives? 
1. Safety and Soundness; Systemic Risk 
From the perspective of safety and soundness of individual 
banking organizations, there is at least one straightforward, 
plausible argument for allowing FHCs to conduct physical 
commodities trading as a diversification strategy. Diversifying 
their business activities by investing in oil pipelines and metals 
warehouses should make FHCs less vulnerable to periodic cri-
ses in financial markets. Trading, transporting, storing, and 
processing physical commodities is a volatile business, and that 
volatility is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.402 It 
is a reliably profitable business, as global commodity prices 
have been rising since the early 2000s and, despite sudden ups 
and downs, are expected to continue rising in response to in-
creasing global demand.403
As professional intermediaries, financial institutions ap-
pear to be perfectly positioned to assume that lucrative role. 
Large FHCs have huge balance sheets, access to cheaper fi-
nancing, superior access to information and in-house research 
capacity, and sophisticated financial derivatives trading capa-
bilities. To the extent that utilizing these unique advantages 
allows FHCs to be more efficient, low-cost suppliers of physical 
commodities and related logistics services, allowing them to 
perform that function should produce economic benefits for the 
 Intermediating physical commodi-
ties trading is the surest way to profit from these trends. 
 
 402. See Tony Levene, Commodity Prices: High-Flying Oil Kings, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/38330322-f8f7-11e1-8d92 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd.  
 403. Id. 
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FHCs and their customers.404
This traditional economic efficiency-based argument, how-
ever, misses or ignores a crucial fact—namely, that running a 
physical commodities business also diversifies the sources and 
spectrum of risk to which FHCs become exposed as a result. Let 
us imagine, for example, that an accident or explosion on board 
an oil tanker owned and operated by one of Morgan Stanley’s 
subsidiaries causes a large oil spill in an environmentally frag-
ile area of the ocean. As the shocking news of the disaster 
spreads, it may lead Morgan Stanley’s counterparties in the fi-
nancial markets to worry about the firm’s financial strength 
and creditworthiness. Because the full extent of Morgan Stan-
ley’s clean-up costs and legal liabilities would be difficult to es-
timate upfront, it would be reasonable for the firm’s counter-
parties to seek to reduce their financial exposure to it.
 
405
But there is more. What would make this hypothetical oil 
spill particularly salient is a shocking revelation that the ulti-
mate owner of the disaster-causing oil tanker was not Exxon-
Mobil or Chevron but Morgan Stanley, a major U.S. banking 
organization not commonly associated with the oil business. 
That revelation, in and of itself, could create a far broader polit-
ical controversy that would inevitably invite additional public 
scrutiny of the commodity dealings of Goldman, JPMC, and 
other Wall Street firms. Thus, in effect, an industrial accident 
could potentially cause a major systemic disturbance in the fi-
nancial markets. These hidden contagion channels make our 
current notion of interconnectedness in financial markets seem 
rather quaint by comparison. FHCs’ expansion into the oil, gas, 
and other physical commodity businesses introduces a whole 
new level of interconnections and vulnerabilities into the al-
ready fragile financial system.  
 In 
effect, it could trigger a run on the firm’s assets and bring Mor-
gan Stanley to the verge of liquidity crisis or collapse.  
 
 404. By assuming this role of a “super-intermediary,” financial institutions 
effectively—and far more successfully—adopted the business model pioneered 
by Enron. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Gene-
alogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 783, 823–32 (2013).  
 405. For example, in early 2013, it was estimated that BP’s total losses in 
connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident reached at least $90 bil-
lion. This sum included not only the direct clean-up and remediation costs but 
also various government fines and accumulating legal expenses. Guy Chazan 
& Ed Crooks, Claims May Push BP’s Oil Spill Bill to $90bn, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/097ca8f4-6f6b-11e2-b906-00144feab49a 
.html#axzz2eEZAEPXd. 
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The basic economic efficiency-based argument may also be 
overstating the claim that forcing U.S. FHCs out of the physical 
commodity and energy business would leave consumers’ needs 
in those markets unmet. Traditional commodity trading com-
panies will almost certainly step in to fill any such gap. These 
non-bank commodity traders may not be able to offer the same 
“fully integrated risk management” services to industrial cli-
ents by assuming nearly all financial risk (and logistical head-
aches) inherent in such clients’ commodity-driven businesses. 
That possibility lends some support to the argument for letting 
banks act as super-intermediaries, or commodity traders plus. 
At the same time, however, it begs the real question as to 
why banks are able to out-compete other commodity traders in 
this realm, or where that all-important plus comes from. Huge 
balance sheets, high credit ratings, and access to plentiful and 
relatively cheap financing—these factors enable large banking 
organizations to absorb their clients’ commodity-related risks 
at a lower cost than anyone else could.406 These unique ad-
vantages ultimately stem from the fact that, by taking deposits 
and serving as the main channel for the flow of payments and 
credit throughout the economy, banks perform a “special” pub-
lic service and, therefore, enjoy a special public subsidy through 
access to federal deposit insurance, special liquidity facilities, 
and other forms of implicit government guarantees.407
If banks’ superior ability to provide commodity-related ser-
vices is rooted in the federal subsidy, the answer to that ques-
tion is not as simple as the efficiency argument assumes.
 In this 
context, the discussion should focus not on a factual question of 
whether banks are in the best position to offer these services 
more efficiently, but on a normative question: should banks be 
offering them at all?  
408
 
 406. See Meyer, supra note 
 If 
taxpayers are the party ultimately conferring this precious eco-
6 (quoting Blythe Masters). 
 407. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS (1983), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm.  
 408. In June 2012, when Moody’s downgraded JPMC’s credit rating by 
three levels, the rating agency was quoted as saying that:  
  [JPMC] benefited from the assumption that there’s a “very high 
likelihood” the U.S. government would back the bank’s bondholders 
and creditors if it defaulted on its debt . . . Without the implied feder-
al backing, [JPMC]’s long-term deposit rating would have been three 
levels lower and its senior debt would have dropped two more steps. 
Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Trading Loss Drove Three-Level Standalone Cut, 
BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-22/ 
jpmorgan-trading-loss-drove-three-level-standalone-cut.html.  
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nomic benefit on banks, taxpayers also have the right to stop 
banks from abusing that benefit by engaging in risky commer-
cial activities unrelated to their “special” functions.409 The 
choice of moving into the physical commodities business does 
not belong solely to bank executives—the choice ultimately be-
longs to the taxpaying, bank-subsidizing public.410 If JPMC’s 
management wants to be free to make profits by drilling for 
and shipping crude oil, it should be able to do so without the es-
timated $14 billion in annual federal subsidy it receives as a 
“special” banking institution.411
2. Conflicts of Interest, Market Manipulation, and Consumer 
Protection 
  
Banks’ extensive involvement in physical commodity activ-
ities also raises significant concerns with respect to potential 
conflicts of interest and market integrity. One of the key policy 
 
 409. Despite the skillfully constructed legal fiction of “complementarity” of 
physical commodities trading to derivatives activities, and an even more insid-
ious fiction of derivatives trading as part of the “business of banking,” there is 
no inherent connection or relatedness between traditional banking functions 
and trading physical barrels of oil. 
 410. Quantifying this public subsidy, especially in its implicit forms, is an 
inherently complex task. A recent academic study estimates that, between 
1990 and 2010, large financial institutions received an average funding cost 
advantage of approximately 28 basis points per year, reaching a peak of 120 
basis points in 2009. That advantage translates into an average total subsidy 
of about $20 billion per year, topping $100 billion in 2009. Viral V. Acharya et 
al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State 
Guarantees 3 (Jan. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656. To the extent the 
study focuses on bond credit spreads and uses on-balance sheet financial data, 
however, it may be underestimating the true size of the implicit public subsidy 
to large financial institutions. 
 411. See Editorial, Dear Mr. Dimon, Is Your Bank Getting Corporate Wel-
fare?, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012 
-06-18/dear-mr-dimon-is-your-bank-getting-corporate-welfare-.html (stating 
that, according to the IMF research and Bloomberg’s own analysis of bank 
balance sheets, JPMC receives a government subsidy worth about $14 billion a 
year). 
  It is worth noting that section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which 
imposes quantitative and qualitative limitations on transactions between fed-
erally insured depository institutions and their affiliates, should theoretically 
prevent the leakage of this public subsidy from banks to their commodity-
trading non-bank affiliates. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2012). As the recent crisis 
demonstrated, however, the practical effectiveness of this statutory firewall is 
subject to considerable doubt. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-
Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal 
Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1769 (2011). 
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reasons for separating banking from commerce is the fear of 
banks unfairly restricting their commercial-market competi-
tors’ access to credit, the lifeblood of the economy. Without reli-
able empirical data, it is difficult to assess the extent to which 
this obvious form of conflict of interest currently presents a 
problem in the commodities sector. Yet, there is a heightened 
danger that banks may use their financial market power to 
gain an unfair advantage in commodities markets, and vice 
versa.  
Goldman’s role in the ongoing aluminum warehousing cri-
sis provides an instructive example. As discussed above, Coca-
Cola complained that Goldman intentionally created a bottle-
neck at its Metro warehouses in order to drive up market prices 
for aluminum and sell their own metal stock at the inflated 
price. It is curious, however, that more industrial end-users did 
not publicly complain—or complain a lot sooner or louder—
about this potential conflict-of-interest situation. Perhaps, this 
artificial aluminum shortage did not hurt their businesses 
quite as badly as it did Coca-Cola’s. Or maybe they did not 
think that Goldman was so blatantly self-serving. It is also pos-
sible that commercial companies deliberately avoided an open 
confrontation with Goldman because it was a Wall Street pow-
erhouse with which they had—or hoped to establish—
important credit and financial-advisory relationships. If they 
were facing Metro as an independent warehousing operator, 
they might have felt less pressure to keep quiet—and to con-
tinue paying high aluminum premia. This form of subtle coun-
terparty coercion may be difficult to detect and police but it 
raises a legitimate question for further inquiry. 
Moreover, metal warehousing operations are only one ele-
ment in a large financial conglomerate’s complex business 
strategy involving trading in metals and related financial con-
tracts. It is no coincidence that Goldman is “one of the largest 
traders of derivatives in the metals markets.”412
 
 412. Jack Farchy, Goldman Sachs Heads of Metals to Retire, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/497280ba-13d0-11e2-8260-00144 
feabdc0.html.  
 Unlike an in-
dependent warehouse operator, Goldman can potentially use its 
storage capabilities not only to generate rental income but also 
to move commodity prices in a way that would benefit its deriv-
atives positions. According to a Reuters report, “critics question 
whether banks and trade houses who speculate on price should 
be allowed to run the warehouses and therefore gain special in-
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sight into one of the key drivers of price, namely, LME invento-
ries.”413
This directly implicates serious issues of market integrity. 
As one of the world’s biggest dealers in commodity deriva-
tives,
  
414
It should be noted here that one of the fundamental drivers 
of the value of any derivative is the degree of volatility of the 
value of the underlying asset. If the value of the underlying as-
set is predictably stable, neither hedgers nor speculators would 
have any reason to enter into derivative contracts tied to that 
value. Conversely, the higher the volatility, the higher the de-
mand for derivatives instruments allowing transfer of the un-
derlying risk. This basic fact reveals the fundamental incentive 
for a derivatives dealer with sufficient market power in the un-
derlying physical commodity markets to maintain price volatili-
ty in such markets, regardless of the fundamentals of supply 
and demand, as the necessary condition of continuing viability 
and profitability of its commodity derivatives business.  
 Goldman can devise and execute highly sophisticated 
trading strategies across multiple markets. The ability to influ-
ence prices of physical assets underlying derivatives, in effect, 
completes the circle. It makes Goldman’s derivatives profits not 
so much a function of its traders’ superior skills or executives’ 
talents, but primarily a function of the firm’s structural market 
power.  
Market manipulation in commodities markets has long 
been “a hot button issue.”415 In contrast to securities markets, 
commodities markets are particularly vulnerable to so-called 
market power-based manipulation that may not involve fraud 
or deceptive conduct.416 A large trader can significantly move 
prices of futures and underlying physical commodities not only 
by “cornering” the market in a particular product but also by 
placing very large sell/buy orders in excess of available liquidi-
ty.417
 
 413. Maytaal Angel, Storage Play by Glencore, Trafigura Pushes Up Lead 
Costs, REUTERS, Sept. 18, 2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
09/18/uk-glencore-lead-idUKBRE88H0L420120918.  
 This salience of market power in commodities market ma-
nipulation underscores the potential dangers of allowing large 
financial institutions to dominate both commodity derivatives 
 414. See Farchy, supra note 412. 
 415. Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, 
and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2010). 
 416. Id. at 3–4. 
 417. Id. at 4. 
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markets and the related cash commodity markets. 
Finally, artificially high premia for industrial aluminum 
translate into higher consumer prices for a wide range of prod-
ucts, from soft drinks to automobiles. Similarly, if JPMC’s 
commodity traders did, in fact, inflate wholesale power prices 
in California, their manipulative conduct accounts for retail 
consumers’ higher electricity bills. Generally, commodity price 
inflation is a major component of consumer price inflation. To 
the extent that banks’ direct involvement in physical commodi-
ty markets distorts traditional supply-and-demand dynamics 
and contributes to commodity price volatility, it becomes an 
important matter of consumer protection. 
An unsustainable rise in consumer prices, driven by the 
rising prices of basic commodities, has significant macro-
economic consequences. The recent spikes in nationwide gaso-
line and heating oil prices illustrate these systemic effects. De-
spite the general prevalence of traditional supply-and-demand 
theories, there is also a legitimate argument that a significant 
factor explaining these prices is purely financial speculation in 
oil.418
3. Concentration of Economic and Political Power  
 A full discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope 
of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that large financial 
intermediaries enable and amplify such speculation by creat-
ing, marketing, and dealing in commodity-linked financial 
products. Indirectly, these intermediaries’ physical commodi-
ties operations contribute to speculative bubbles in key com-
modities, which ultimately increase the cost of living for ordi-
nary Americans. Because rises in the costs of basic goods tend 
to disproportionally affect the poor, this artificially-created 
price volatility can widen socio-economic disparities that have 
tangible and potentially grave consequences for social cohesion 
and civil unity. From this perspective, large FHCs’ physical 
commodities businesses raise potential concerns not only as a 
matter of consumer protection but also as a matter of macro-
prudential regulation and even political stability.  
Concerns with potential conflicts of interest, market ma-
nipulation, and consumer protection are closely connected to 
 
 418. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kennedy II, The High Cost of Gambling on Oil, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, at A23; Robert Lenzner, Speculation in Crude Oil 
Adds $23.39 to the Price per Barrel, FORBES, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/02/27/speculation-in-crude-oil-adds-23-39 
-to-the-price-per-barrel. 
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the broader policy concern with excessive concentration of eco-
nomic power. That concern looms especially large in the context 
of FHCs’ physical commodity trading. 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this issue 
for the long-term health and vitality of the U.S. economy and of 
American democracy. Writing almost a century ago, Justice 
Brandeis famously warned against the dangers of combina-
tion—or “concentration intensive and comprehensive”—that 
gave financial institutions direct control over industrial enter-
prises.419 Brandeis saw the “subtle and often long-concealed 
concentration of distinct functions, which are beneficient when 
separately administered, and dangerous only when combined in 
the same persons” as a great threat to economic and political 
liberties.420
The global financial crisis of 2008–09 demonstrated the 
continuing salience of Brandeis’s concerns. The taxpayer-
funded bailout of large financial conglomerates whose risky ac-
tivities had contributed to—and, indeed, largely created—the 
crisis reignited the century-old debate on the role of “financial 
oligarchy” in American politics.
  
421 Not surprisingly, one of the 
central themes in post-crisis regulatory reform is the preven-
tion of future bailouts of “too-big-to-fail” financial institu-
tions.422 The ongoing transformation of large U.S. financial in-
stitutions into leading global merchants of physical 
commodities and energy, however, significantly complicates the 
reformers’ task. By giving banks that are already “too-big-to-
fail” an additional source of leverage over the economy—and, 
consequently, the polity—it elevates the dangers inherent in 
cross-sector concentration of economic power to a qualitatively 
new level.423
 
 419. BRANDEIS, supra note 
 When large financial conglomerates that control 
access to money and credit also control access to such universal 
production inputs as raw materials and energy, their already 
outsized influence on the entire economic—and, by extension, 
political—system may reach alarming proportions. For these 
reasons, in rethinking the foundational principle of separating 
banking and commerce, especially in the context of energy and 
18, at 4.  
 420. Id. at 6. 
 421. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL 
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12, 28 (2010); Matt 
Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 3, 2011, at 44–51.  
 422. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 421, at 174–80. 
 423. Id. at 203–05. 
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commodity activities, it is critically important to remember 
Brandeis’s warnings. Reassessing and reasserting the original 
antitrust spirit of U.S. bank holding company regulation may 
be the necessary first step in the right direction.424
4. Beyond the Foundational Myth: Limits of Governability 
and Regulatory Capacity 
  
An examination of FHCs’ physical commodity activities al-
so highlights potential problems such activities pose from the 
perspective of regulatory design, regulatory process, and firm 
governability. 
Understanding what exactly large U.S. FHCs own and do 
in global commodity markets is the critical first step toward 
developing an informed regulatory approach to this issue. Un-
der the current regulatory disclosure system, there is no relia-
ble way to gather and evaluate this information. Existing pub-
lic disclosure is woefully inadequate to understand and 
evaluate the nature and scope of U.S. banking organizations’ 
physical commodities trading assets and activities. It may not 
be feasible or desirable to mandate detailed disclosure of every 
commercial activity of a large FHC, but when it comes to ener-
gy and other key commodities, what is hidden from the public 
view may be highly consequential.425
Simply mandating more disclosure, however, will not be 
enough. The recent crisis has demonstrated the limits of disclo-
sure as a regulatory tool, especially in the context of complex 
 It is imperative, therefore, 
to mandate full public disclosure of financial institutions’ direct 
and indirect activities and investments in physical commodities 
and energy.  
 
 424. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 28, at 146. 
 425. The Dodd-Frank Act requires SIFIs to submit to federal regulators 
enterprise-wide recovery and resolution plans, or “living wills,” to help their 
orderly resolutions in the event of failure. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 165(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1426–27 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 
(2012)). Goldman, Morgan Stanley, JPMC, and other large FHCs have already 
submitted their living wills to the Board in July 2012. These documents 
should provide an exhaustive description of each institution’s corporate struc-
ture and core business activities. They could give regulators the necessary in-
formation on these firms’ physical commodity assets and operations. It is not 
clear, however, whether this is actually the case, as the bulk of the infor-
mation in these resolution plans is confidential. None of the publicly available 
portions of the living wills filed to date contain any relevant information on 
this issue. See Resolution Plans, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (July 2, 
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm.  
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markets, institutions, and instruments.426 Complexity is one of 
the fundamental drivers of systemic risk, and managing com-
plexity is one of the key challenges in today’s financial services 
sector.427
More importantly, mixing banking with physical commodi-
ty trading creates potentially insurmountable challenges from 
the perspective of regulatory efficiency and capacity. Direct 
linkages, through the common key dealer-banks, between the 
vitally important and volatile financial market and the vitally 
important and volatile commodity and energy market may am-
plify the inherent fragility of both markets, as well as the en-
tire economy. Who can effectively regulate and supervise this 
new super-market? And how should it be done?  
 Large U.S. financial conglomerates are already com-
plex, in terms of their corporate structure, risk management, 
and the breadth and depth of financial services and products 
they offer. Allowing these firms to run extensive commercial 
operations that require specialized technical and managerial 
expertise adds to their internal complexity. Firm-wide coordi-
nation and monitoring of operations, finances, risks, and legal 
and regulatory compliance become all the more difficult in that 
context. This is particularly true of capital-intensive, opera-
tionally complex, and potentially high-risk physical commodity 
activities. An effective integration of these operations may be 
further complicated by potential shifts in corporate culture. 
Thus, the traditionally aggressive risk-taking culture of com-
modity traders (think Enron) may push the already questiona-
ble ethics of bankers beyond the limits of prudency and legality. 
All of these factors present serious challenges for large finan-
cial firms’ internal governance and governability.  
The U.S. system of financial services regulation is already 
highly fragmented and ill-suited to detect and reduce systemic 
risk across different financial markets and products. The ex-
pansion of FHCs’ activities into yet more new areas subject to 
extensive regulation under very different regulatory schemes—
environmental regulation, workplace safety regulation, utility 
regulation—lays the foundation for jurisdictional conflicts on 
an unprecedented scale. In addition to the several federal bank 
regulators, the SEC, and CFTC, banking organizations become 
subject to regulation by the DOE, the FERC, the Environmen-
 
 426. See generally Henry Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure In-
formation,’ and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1601 (2012). 
 427. See generally Saule Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of 
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012). 
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tal Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade Commission, 
and possibly other federal and state agencies. Yet, none of the-
se many overseers are likely to see the whole picture, leaving 
potentially dangerous gaps in the regulation and supervision of 
these systemically important super-intermediaries. An addi-
tional complicating factor is the high strategic and geopolitical 
significance of energy trading. The flow of oil and gas in global 
markets is as much a matter of foreign policy and national se-
curity as it is a matter of business. Accordingly, the State De-
partment could also be expected to insist on a say in the affairs 
of large U.S. FHCs that import and export oil, gas, and other 
strategically important commodities.428
In terms of substantive regulatory oversight, the situation 
is equally discouraging. In addition to being the umbrella regu-
lator for BHCs, the Board is now primarily responsible for pru-
dential regulation and supervision of all SIFIs.
 
429 As discussed 
above, physical commodities activities expose financial institu-
tions to qualitatively different, and potentially catastrophic, 
risks. In addition, commodities operations create potential new 
channels of contagion and systemic risk transmission.430
It is not enough to pay lip service to these concerns by 
simply requiring FHCs to conduct their commercial activities in 
compliance with the applicable securities, commodities, energy, 
and other laws and regulations.
 Yet the 
Board is not equipped to regulate and supervise companies that 
own and operate extensive commodity trading assets: oil pipe-
lines, marine vessels, or metal warehouses.  
431
 
 428. One could argue that the State Department might like the idea of big 
U.S. banks as major players in the global energy markets. These banks may 
serve as potential sources of vital economic intelligence and levers of increas-
ing American influence in notoriously opaque and strategically important oil 
and gas markets. It is far from clear, however, how effective the State De-
partment can be in harnessing big private banks’ market power to serve the 
country’s strategic objectives, especially if such objectives conflict with the 
Board’s prudential oversight goals. Introducing this element into the mix of 
policies governing the U.S. financial institutions is likely to make the existing 
system of financial services regulation even more complicated and less effec-
tive. 
 Those regulatory schemes 
are not designed with SIFIs in mind and, therefore, do not ad-
dress the unique risks—enterprise-wide and systemic—posed 
 429. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113, 165, 124 Stat. at 1398–1402, 1423–32 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5364–5365). 
 430. See supra Part IV.B.1.  
 431. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
  
354 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:265 
 
by their activities.432
C. BEYOND BANKING: PUSHING CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL 
BOUNDARIES  
 Realistically, however, the Board has little 
choice but rely on FHCs’ promises to comply with such parallel 
regulatory regimes. Without the necessary expertise and a 
clear legal mandate, neither the Board nor any other financial 
regulator can be expected to exercise meaningful oversight of 
large financial institutions’ commodity businesses and the risks 
they generate. This natural limit on regulatory capacity is an 
important reason for serious reconsideration of FHCs’ role in 
physical commodities markets.  
This Article has focused upon U.S. FHCs’ involvement in 
physical commodities trading and related commercial activities. 
In recent decades, however, the intertwined processes of bank 
disintermediation, functional convergence of financial products, 
and consolidation of the financial services industry have signif-
icantly reduced sector-specific differences among large financial 
intermediaries. By subjecting all SIFIs to enhanced prudential 
oversight and orderly resolution requirements typically applied 
to depository institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act, in effect, 
acknowledged the fact that systemic risk can be created and 
transmitted not only by commercial banks and their affiliates 
but also by investment banks, insurance firms, and other regu-
lated and unregulated financial market participants.  
Against this broader institutional backdrop, the analysis 
presented in this Article raises two additional issues of consid-
erable practical and theoretical significance. 
The first question is this: if it is socially desirable to pre-
vent banks from conducting commercial activities in physical 
commodities, is it also not desirable—and even necessary—to 
apply the same rule to all large, systemically significant finan-
cial institutions? The same public policy concerns that arise 
with respect to banking organizations’ commodity trading—
heightened potential for conflicts of interest and market ma-
nipulation, an excessive concentration of market power, in-
creased systemic risk from direct linkages between financial 
 
 432. Generally, these specialized regulatory regimes pursue policy goals 
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markets and economically vital commodities markets, and less-
ened governability of financial institutions—are equally appli-
cable to similar activities conducted by non-bank SIFIs. There-
fore, as a matter of both theoretical consistency and practical 
efficacy, there is a strong argument for extending the old prin-
ciple of separation of banking and commerce beyond the bank-
ing sector, at least with respect to physical commodities and 
energy activities.  
The second theoretical question stems from the fact that 
financial institutions’ growing involvement in the physical 
commodities and energy trade pushes the boundaries of the 
fundamental concept of financial intermediation itself. What 
are the core functions of financial intermediaries in modern 
economy? How far are we willing to stretch the definition of fi-
nancial—as opposed to trade—intermediation as a distinct 
form of service-based economic activity? The blurring of these 
boundaries in practice inevitably creates conceptual ambiguity, 
which in turn may lead to confused and ineffective policy choic-
es and legal doctrines. An empirical analysis of large financial 
institutions’ physical commodity activities provides an oppor-
tunity to revisit these foundational concepts as the basis for po-
tentially reconfiguring the entire system of financial services 
regulation. This, however, is a subject for future inquiry. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has explored the legal, regulatory, policy, and 
theoretical aspects of an ongoing transformation of large U.S. 
banking organizations into global merchants of physical com-
modities and energy. In the absence of detailed and reliable in-
formation, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to the 
social efficiency and desirability of allowing this transformation 
to continue. What we can already ascertain about U.S. financial 
institutions’ physical commodity assets and activities, however, 
raises potentially serious public policy concerns that must be 
addressed through a fully-informed public deliberation. Even if 
big U.S. FHCs were, in fact, to scale down their physical com-
modity operations either in response to current regulatory de-
velopments or as a temporary market adjustment, it would not 
obviate the need for such deliberation. Addressing these policy 
concerns in a timely, open, and publicly minded manner re-
mains a task of the utmost importance, both as an economic 
matter and as a matter of democratic governance.  
